An Alternative Constitutional Treaty for the European Union

We propose an alternativeto the Constitutional Treaty drafted by theEuropean Convention. Our proposaleffectively limits the domain of governmentat the Union level. It takes the incentivesof the European public actors into account.We propose a second chamber of EuropeanParliament composed of delegates of theparliaments of the member states and asecond court composed of delegates of thehighest courts of the member states. Theseinstitutions will be the guardians of thesubsidiarity principle. The principle ofthe separation of powers is implemented byabolishing the Commission's monopoly oflegislative initiative and by curtailingthe Council's legislative role. Treatyamendments will not be drafted by aninter-governmental conference but by aninter-parliamentary conference. We proposeto change the method of financing andintroduce referenda.     

Building Consensual Institutions: Networks and the National Estuary Program

Currently, many approaches to solving policy problems seek to create community-based, less coercive solutions that are creating the conditions for the birth of new regional governmental institutions. We argue that networks form the core of these emergent structures and that federal programs can play a positive role in developing local networks. Our empirical work compares networks in estuaries included in National Estuary Program with networks in comparable estuaries that were not. We find that the networks in NEP areas span more levels of government, integrate more experts into policy discussions, nurture stronger interpersonal ties between stakeholders, and create greater faith in the procedural fairness of local policy, thus laying the foundation for a new form of cooperative governance.     

Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between 'power' and 'luck', the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts on average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making.     

Participatory Budgeting in Germany – A Review of Empirical Findings

Participatory budgeting (PB) is one of the most popular democratic innovations worldwide. PB is connected with high stakes regarding mobilizing political inactive citizens, efficient and effective budgetary policy as well as positive effects on citizens (e.g., civic education, democratic attitudes). However, in many Western countries empirical evidence for such benefits is scarce. This also holds for Germany. Since the conduction of PB demands financial and personnel resources, a thorough evaluation is necessary. This article systematically summarizes the current state of research to make the literature on PB in Germany accessible to international scholars as well as political and administrative practitioners. It focusses on the context (which municipalities conduct PB and why), process (role of local administration and council, participation, deliberation), and outcome/impact dimension (outcomes and impact on policies and citizens). To conclude, further research venues are briefly outlined, followed by an outlook on PBs future and practical implications.     

Foreign Aid and Undeserved Credit Claiming

Politicians in developing countries misuse foreign aid to get reelected by fiscally manipulating foreign aid resources or domestic budgets. Our article suggests another mechanism that does not require politicians to have any control over foreign aid in order to make use of it for electoral purposes: undeserved credit claiming. We analyze the conditions under which local politicians can undeservedly take credit for the receipt of foreign aid and thereby boost their chances of reelection. We theorize that politicians can employ a variety of techniques to claim credit for development aid even when they have little or no influence on its actual allocation. Using a subnational World Bank development program in the Philippines, we demonstrate that credit claiming is an important strategy to exploit foreign aid inflows and that the political effects of aid can persist even when projects are designed to minimize the diversion or misuse of funds.     

Organized contraband smuggling and its enforcement in Canada: An assessment of the anti-smuggling initiative

This article provides an overview of contemporary cigarette and liquor smuggling affecting Canada and summarizes the results of research that evaluates a Federal enforcement program in this country entitled the Anti-Smuggling Initiative (ASI). To combat the escalation and increased organization of cigarette smuggling, the Canadian Government provided special funding to federal enforcement and prosecution agencies beginning in 1994. The program evaluation concluded that there was a substantial decrease in the contraband tobacco market as a result of the ASI initiatives; however, evidence suggests that reductions in Canadian cigarette taxes made during the same period were the most powerful policy tool in influencing cigarette smuggling. While the ASI laid the foundation for success in dismantling some of the largest known tobacco and liquor smuggling operations in Canada, it does not appear to have had a strong deterrent effect on organized smuggling in general. Instead, the impact on smuggling groups can more accurately be characterized as one of displacement. Indeed, history shows that early successes in organized crime enforcement are often followed by diminishing returns as criminal groups become more adaptive and sophisticated. This research concludes that to most effectively address the smuggling of legal goods, enforcement must be supplemented with taxation policies that reduce the financial viability and attractiveness of this trade.     

Efficiency and effectiveness control based on economic analysis: The example of the Austrian court of audit

The purpose of this article is fivefold: First, we demonstrate the potential and importance of central auditing in Austria in section 2.1 before identifying the causes of public-sector inefficiency in section 2.2. Then we outline the organizational structure in section 3 and describe the need for return in section 4. We develop proposals for improving the central auditing system in section 5. In so doing, we endeavor not to succumb to the pervasive influence of the well-established, yet objectionable Austrian status quo, realizing that our proposals may be rejected by politicians and bureaucrats as being unrealistic.