Intergovernmental cooperation,regulatory agencies and transportation regulation in Canada: the case of Part III of the National Transportation Act

In the National Transportation Act of 1967, provision was made, by means of Part III of the legislation, for the federal government to regulate directly the extra-provincial motor carrier industry. This section has never been implemented and this article attempts to explain why. Such an explanation, it is argued, is important because of the philosophy of the NTA, the responsibilities given to the Canadian Transport Commission and the inadequacies of the existing provincial regulatory systems. The explanation is to be found in an analysis of two factors whose interrelationship has been given inadequate attention. The first factor is the growing recognition of the need for intergovernmental collaboration in transportation planning and regulation. The second is the role of regulatory bodies in the policy process. The argument is advanced that the conflict over implementation of Part in illustrates a number of problems with respect to the appropriate functions of regulatory agencies, particularly in the context of intergovernmental negotiations. The article concludes with the suggestion for a possible course of action that may be applicable to other policy areas. Sommaire. La partie III de la Loi nationale sur les transports de 1967 prévoyait la régulation directe par le gouvernement fédéral de l'industrie du transport extre-provincial par véhicule moteur. Ces dispositions n'ont jamais été mises en application et le présent article tente d'en expliquer les raisons. Une explication s'impose, en effet, en raison de la philosophie même de la loi, des responsabilités qui incombent à la Commission canadienne des transports et des faiblesses de la règlementation provinciale actuelle. L'auteur attribue cette situation à deux facteurs dont l'interdépendance a été sous-estimée. Le premier est celui de la reconnaissance accrue de la nécessité d'une collaboration intergouvernementale pour la planification et la régulation des transports. Le second est le rôle des organismes de regulation dans l'élaboration de la politique en la matière. On suggère que le conflit touchant la mise en application de la Partie in de la loi fait ressorti un certain nombre de problèmes relatifs à la détermination des functions propres des organismes de régulation, particulièrement dans le contexte des négociations intergou-vemnementales. L'article propose en conclusion une ligne de conduite qui pourrait convenir à d'autres secteurs.     

“That shit doesn't fly”: Subcultural constraints on prison radicalization

Many observers describe prison subcultures as inherently and irredeemably antisocial. Research directly ties prison subcultures to violence, gang membership, and poor reintegration. In extreme cases, research has also suggested that prison subcultures contribute to incarcerated people joining radical groups or embracing violent extremist beliefs. These claims, however, ignore key differences in the larger cultural and social context of prisons. We examine the relationship between prison subcultures and prison radicalization based on semistructured qualitative interviews with 148 incarcerated men and 131 correctional officers from four western Canadian prisons. We outline several imported features of the prison subculture that make incarcerated people resilient to radicalized and extremist messaging. These features include 1) national cultural imaginaries; 2) the racial profile of a prison, including racial sorting or a lack thereof; and 3) how radicalization allowed incarcerated men and correctional officers to act outside the otherwise agreed-to subcultural rules. Our research findings stress the importance of contemplating broader sociocultural influences when trying to understand the relationship between radicalization and prison dynamics and politics.