The "Compliance" Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement

Simple deterrence will often fail to produce compliance commitment because it does not directly address business perceptions of the morality of regulated behavior. Responsive regulation, by contrast, seeks to build moral commitment to compliance with the law. This article shows that a regulator can overcome the deterrence trap to improve compliance commitment with the skillful use of responsive regulatory techniques that "leverage" the deterrence impact of its enforcement strategies with moral judgments. But this leads it into the "compliance trap." The compliance trap occurs where there is a lack of political support for the moral seriousness of the law it must enforce, such as is the case with cartel enforcement in Australia. In these circumstances, business offenders are likely to interpret the moral leveraging of responsive regulation as unfair or stigmatizing, and business perceptions of regulator unfairness are likely to have a negative influence on long-term compliance with the law. Moreover, big businesses that perceive regulatory enforcement as illegitimate are also likely to actively lobby for the political emasculation of the regulator. In these circumstances, most regulators are likely to avoid conflict by taking the easy option of enforcing the law "softly," and therefore ineffectively.     

The Future of Incidental Findings: Should They be Viewed as Benefits?

This paper argues against considering incidental fndings (IFs) as potential benefts of research when assessing the social value of proposed research, determining the appropriateness of a study's risk/beneft ratio, and identifying and disclosing the risks and benefts of participation during informed consent. The possibility of generating IFs should be disclosed during informed consent as neither a risk nor beneft, but as a possible outcome collateral to participation. Whether specifc IFs will be disclosed when identifed is a separate question whose answer is material to determining whether IFs constitute a risk or a potential indirect beneft of participation. Finally, three types of IF should be distinguished and treated diferently during informed consent: those that will be routinely generated (e.g., results of testing to determine study eligibility), those that can reasonably be characterized in terms of their nature and frequency of generation (e.g., misattributed parentage), and those of unpredictable nature and frequency that can be characterized only in general terms. Research protocols should provide a rationale for sharing or not sharing IFs of these three types with participants. Regulatory review of such plans should not, however, be confused with regarding IFs as potential benefts when assessing the study's risk/beneft ratio or merit.     

Drugs in oral fluid: Part II. Investigation of drugs in drivers

As part of the European project, Impaired Motorists, Methods of Roadside Testing and Assessment for Licensing, otherwise known as IMMORTAL (Deliverable R4.2), the University of Glasgow was required to analyse 1396 oral fluid samples, collected from drivers, for a wide range of drugs. A previously described method to include 49 drugs and metabolites was used. To include cannabis in the study a separate extraction method was required because of interferences caused by the collection device. The study group included drivers who were stopped at random and participation was entirely voluntary. The results showed that out of the 1396 samples tested, 16.8% were positive for at least one drug. In the majority of positive cases (85%), monodrug use was found and the most commonly detected drug was 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine. This study showed that a significant number of the driving population are positive for at least one drug.     

Assessing legal change: Recidivism and administrative per se laws

Tougher sanctions for drunk driving have often been advocated as a means to reduce this problematic behavior. In a test of administrative per se laws as a specific deterrent, the impact of introducing such laws is evaluated by examining reconviction rates of offenders before and after implementation of the Jaw in three states (North Dakota, Louisiana, and Mississippi), with comparisons made to a fourth state during the same time period that did not implement an administrative per se law (California). Recidivism is analyzed using survival models. The results indicate that administrative per se laws reduce rates of reconviction in some situations but not in others. In particular, if implementation of the law is accompanied by changes in overall rates of license actions, the specific deterrent effects of the law may be outweighed by the increased efficiencies of this judicial process.