Day care and female employment in Mexico: descriptive evidence and policy considerations

"This paper analyzes the supply and organization of public day care in Mexico and presents a series of considerations as to the formulation of future policy. The research concentrates on the evolution of public policies to provide day care to working women in the formal sector through the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS). Data on the evolution of female labor force participation, changes in family structure, the supply of day care and patterns of child care arrangements, suggest that access to formal facilities falls short of demand.... Innovative policies for the reorganization and expansion of the provision of day care are presently under consideration." (EXCERPT)     

A critique of quasiexperimental and statistical controils for measuring program effects: Application to urban growth control

Most studies evaluating the effect on housing prices of regulatory programs for controlling urban growth use econometric methods (hedonic price models) without considering the research-design aspects of the task. The article examines the strengths and weaknesses of several quasiexperimental and statistical methods for measuring the effect of growth-control programs, using criteria extracted from theory. The methodological critique is tested empirically by comparing several methods using data from the growth-control community of Davis, California and from three comparison communities. The empirical test demonstrates that different research designs can produce, large differences in the magnitudes of estimated effects, and that adding statistical controls to quasiexperimental controls permits the detection of smaller effects.     

The distribution of honoraria income in the U.S. Congress: Who gets rents in legislatures and why?

The major conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that low-cost suppliers of political favors receive the highest honoraria incomes. There is no evidence that being a lawyer, acquiring a large number of committee assignments, receiving high ratings by labor unions, representing a safe district, or introducing numerous legislative bills, increases one's honoraria income in any significant way. The wider dispersal of power reduces the effects of seniority, and membership on the Finance Committee, in determining institutional power in the Senate; hence, these variables are only significantly related to honoraria income in the House. The smaller the number of suppliers in the Senate, relative to the House, means that senators obtain higher prices for their services. As a result, business groups are more willing to pay extra — a price premium — to assure that no shirking occurs.While the distribution of honoraria has caused considerable concern and given rise to cynical explanations as to who gets them and why (see, for example, McChesney, 1987), this analysis suggests a less pejorative but empirically valid conclusion: business, and therefore honoraria, gravitate to those who can supply political favors at a lower cost than other legislators, just as low-cost suppliers gain a greater proportion of the sales in the market than those who supply the same service but at a higher price.     

To What Extent Do Third Parties Influence Business Compliance?

Regulatory scholars have increasingly observed that it is not only public regulatory agencies and official enforcement action that motivate and enforce businesses' compliance with the law; in many situations, certain third parties may have greater capacity and power to motivate and enforce compliance with the law than do official regulatory agencies. This paper examines the extent to which businesses' worries about, and perceptions of pressure from, various third parties influence their internal compliance management activities and moral commitment in relation to complying with the objectives of competition and consumer protection law. Using data from a survey of 999 large Australian businesses, we find that businesses worry a lot about the reactions of a range of third parties including customers, shareholders, employees, and business partners to non-compliance. We find little evidence that these worries have much impact on what businesses actually do. However, perceptions of risk of complaints do influence what they do.     

A Move Toward Specificity: Examining Urban Disadvantage and Race-and Relationship-Specific Homicide Rates

The purpose of this research is to estimate the differential impact of structural conditions on race- and relationship-specific homicide rates for U.S. cities in 1990. The structural conditions commonly employed in race-specific homicide research are examined, such as job accessibility, economic deprivation, racial segregation, and racial inequality. Furthermore, four relationship categories of homicide—acquaintance, family, stranger, and intimate—are disaggregated by racial group. The detailed relationship-specific homicide rates are compared to a baseline homicide rate to determine whether structural factors associated with urban disadvantage similarly influence homicide rates across relationship types. The results indicate that differences emerge in the impact of structural conditions on homicides disaggregated by race- and relationship-specific categories. Theoretical explanations consistent with criminology and race-relations literature are discussed, as well as the potential benefits and implications for studies that pursue more meaningful and detailed classifications in homicide offending.