法律全球化

提到法律全球化,我们可能联想到整个世界生活在单一法律规则下的程度。基于全球合意或者由于全球所有组成部分的平行发展而形成,这种单一法律规则可能由单一的强制执行角色付诸实施。尽管两极世界和冷战的结束带来些许欣慰,但我们并没有过多移近国际法体制,无论是通过确立单一全球法律提供者和实施者,还是通过坚强有力的民族国家协商一致。如果我们已经有的话,我们会说国际法,而不是法律全球化。我们甚至也不能信心十足地说,法律已经全球化或普遍化,具体表现是不管他/她走到地球的什么地方,人际关系均被一定的法、即使不是各处都相同的法律…     

Interactional fairness judgments: The influence of causal accounts

There has been an increasing amount of research conducted on issues of procedural justice. Although this research has demonstrated that the type of procedure used to allocate outcomes has an independent influence on people's judgments of the fairness of a decision, there is growing empirical evidence that such judgments are influenced by the enactment of the procedure as well. Fairness concerns raised about the propriety of a decision maker's behavior during the enactment of procedures are representative of a desire forinteractional justice. In this paper, we present three studies that examine the effects of giving acausal account, or a justification, versus not providing a justification, on judgments of interactional fairness and endorsement of a decision maker's actions. In Study I, a laboratory study, ratings of interactional fairness and support for a manager were higher when subjects received a causal account that claimed mitigating circumstances for a manager's improper action than when they did not receive such a causal account. A second laboratory study replicated the same pattern of findings in two different organizational contexts. In addition, it was found that the perceived adequacy of the causal account was a critical factor explaining its effect. In Study 3, a field setting, ratings of both interactional fairness and procedural fairness were higher when a manager provided anadequate causal account to justify the allocation of an unfavorable outcome. The discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for research on interactional and procedural justice.     

IN IT FOR THE LONG HAUL? POST‐CONFLICT STATEBUILDING,PEACEBUILDING, AND THE GOOD GOVERNANCE AGENDA IN TIMOR‐LESTE

Statebuilding after conflict often entails liberal peacebuilding measures. The end of the UN mission in post‐conflict Timor‐Leste in December 2012 provides a unique opportunity to investigate statebuilding in practice. The liberal peacebuilding agenda has met with stiff academic resistance—mainly from the critical theorist camp—and is questioned as an appropriate measure of …statebuilding success. We deploy instead the good governance (GG) agenda as a hybrid local‐liberal guide. Drawing on field work, interviews, and secondary documents, we investigate what we see as four key, intertwined and overlapping aspects of GG: state capacity including the establishment of a state bureaucracy, participation and the engagement of civil society, institution building and rule of law, and corruption control and transparency. We note GG provides a useful policy heuristic, while abstract “one‐size‐fits‐all” liberal peacebuilding models, which avoid the complexities of machinery of government issues, the time taken to develop institutions, and historical and contextual environments of countries, are likely to face severe problems. New states may be dependent on external forces to maintain monopoly of violence. The reversibility and uncertainty of statebuilding and the decades‐long commitment needed by international agencies are noted. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Terrorism and Human Rights: A Defence Lawyer's Perspective

ABSTRACT

The author of this article is one of the attorneys appointed to represent Zacarias Moussaoui in the United States. Mr. Moussaoui is the only person facing criminal charges for alleged involvement in the September 11 plot. The author describes the system of government in the United States with a specific emphasis on several terrorism cases pending in the United States. He seeks to assure the readers that the rule of law is paramount in the United States. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court—in the Hamdi and Guantanamo cases—that confirm the constitutional rights of even the most dedicated enemies of the United States, which decisions post-date this submission, only affirm the writer's theme.     

Is this Paper Dangerous? Balancing Secrecy and Openness in Counterterrorism

We analyze a seemingly simple question: When should government share private information that may be useful to terrorists? Policy makers' answer to this question has typically been “it is dangerous to share information that can potentially help terrorists.” Unfortunately, this incomplete response has motivated a detrimental increase in the amount of information government keeps private or labels “sensitive but unclassified.” We identify two distinct types of private information that are potentially useful to terrorists and identify the range of conditions under which sharing each can enhance counterterrorism efforts. Our results highlight the complex trade-offs policy makers face in deciding how much openness is right in a world where protecting the people from terrorists has become a central duty of government.     

VERTICAL STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE PERFORMANCE

We report the results of a study examining the effects of vertical strategic alignment (that is, the degree to which strategic stances are consistent across different organizational levels) on public service performance. Longitudinal multivariate analysis is undertaken on a panel of public organizations over four years. We find that alignment on a prospecting strategy leads to better performance, but that no such effect is observed for a defending strategy. We also find that high levels of prospecting alignment produce stronger positive performance effects in centralized organizations and when environmental uncertainty is high. The implications of these findings for research and practice are considered in the conclusion.     

Corona over Cuba: The Missile Crisis and the Early Limitations of Satellite Imagery Intelligence

In the autumn of 1962, two weeks before U-2 aerial photographs confirmed Soviet deployments of nuclear missiles in Cuba, the US intelligence community attempted to image the island with the spy satellite Corona. Insufficient image resolution and extensive cloud cover, however, prevented this photography from providing solid evidence confirming or denying the presence of offensive missiles. This event – previously unaddressed either by Missile Crisis or Corona scholars – illustrates both the promise and the limits of early satellite imagery intelligence. It further provides insight into the early imagery tasking and coordination process and demonstrates needs that drove further development of national satellite reconnaissance in the years that followed.