The Role of Procedural Controls in OSHA's Ergonomics Rulemaking

Few, if any, regulations over the past decade have received as much publicity or engendered such controversy as the ergonomics regulation of the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA). Some may see the ergonomics rule as the paradigmatic instance of procedural hurdles holding up and eventually destroying a regulation. This article examines the role that procedure played in the ergonomics rulemaking. Lessons are drawn from an analysis of the four publicly available versions of the regulation and interviews with seven high-ranking officials at OSHA and the Small Business Administration. Of the procedural hurdles faced by OSHA, the notice-and-comment requirement had the largest impact on the final rule. OMB review and requirements to conduct a cost-benefit analysis served largely as a fire alarm to political overseers, and the required small business panel had largely symbolic effects. The more traditional control of congressional budgetary oversight had the greatest effect by delaying the rule for three years, and thus eventually doomed OSHA's attempts to regulate.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed in this issue. Daniela Campello, The Politics of Market Discipline in Latin America: Globalization and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Figures, tables, notes, bibliography, index, 239 pp.; hardcover $78.42, paperback $29.99, Kindle $98.40. Eduardo Dargent, Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America: The Experts Running Government. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Tables, figures, bibliography, index. 216 pp.; hardcover $90, ebook $72. Ana Lorena De La O, Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin America: The Quiet Transformation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Figures, tables, bibliography, index, 194 pp.; hardcover $84.99, ebook $68. Jorge Heine and Brigitte Weiffen, 21st Century Democracy Promotion in the Americas: Standing Up for the Polity. New York: Routledge, 2015. Abbreviations, tables, bibliography, index, 196 pp.; hardcover $130, paperback $47. Juan Pablo Luna, Segmented Representation: Political Party Strategies in Unequal Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Tables, maps, figures, bibliography, indexes, 374 pp.; hardcover $115, ebook. Stephen Offutt, New Centers of Global Evangelicalism in Latin America and Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Map, tables, abbreviations, appendixes, bibliography, index, 192 pp.; hardcover $90, ebook $72. Mariela Szwarcberg, Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2015. Figures, tables, maps, notes, bibliography, index, 185 pp.; hardcover $89.99, paperback $32.99, ebook $26. Brian Wampler, Activating Democracy in Brazil: Popular Participation, Social Justice, and Interlocking Institutions. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015. Tables, figures, abbreviations, notes, bibliography, index, 312 pp.; paperback $39, pdf $39. Graham Denyer Willis, The Killing Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and the Regulation of Life and Death in Urban Brazil. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014. Tables, figures, notes, bibliography, index, 216 pp.; hardcover $70, paperback $29.95, ebook $29.95. Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, Reagan and Pinochet: The Struggle over U.S. Policy Toward Chile. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Abbreviations, acronyms, bibliography, index, 354 pp.; hardcover $95, paperback $34.99, ebook $28.     

Ashley Esarey,Mary Alice Haddad,Joanna I. Lewis,and Stevan Harrell,eds., Greening East Asia: the Rise of the Eco-developmental State

Journal of Chinese Political Science -     

THE DOG THAT DIDN'T BARK: HOW PUBLIC MANAGERS HANDLE ENVIRONMENTAL SHOCKS

Do negative budgetary shocks reduce performance in public organizations? If so, by how much and in terms of which criteria? Are public managers able to make internal management choices to limit or eliminate the effects of such shocks? These questions are investigated in a set of hundreds of organizations over an 8‐year period. For the most part, budgetary shocks of 10 per cent or more have only limited or no negative impacts on performance in the short term. The most salient policy objective and production for more disadvantaged clientele are especially insulated from shocks. Decisions about internal resource allocation and personnel management can be shown to protect core production while sacrificing more peripheral activities and capital investment. Questions that remain to be investigated include whether short‐term protection comes at the expense of some longer‐term losses, and—ironically—whether effective management under such circumstances weakens over time the political case for adequate budgets.