Transnational innovation networks aren’t all created equal: towards a classification system

This paper examines the growth of transnational networks of innovation and proposes a preliminary classificatory system of four distinct kinds of forces which give rise to social networks that facilitate knowledge flows, relationship building, and collaborative activities important to accessing global markets. The networks may form around a technology sector, be identity based, emerge from a government-led initiative, or be stimulated by a civic or philanthropic organization. Each has a different mode of organizing, financing, and meeting its objectives, as shown by examples presented in the paper. The proposed classification of these characteristics is intended to open a conversation within the social sciences and among policy makers about how better to understand the ways in which transnational networks get formed, operate and produce desired results.     

Islam,Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan: Insights From a National Sample

We use data from an innovative nationally representative survey of 6,000 Pakistanis in April 2009 to study beliefs about political Islam, Sharia, the legitimacy and efficacy of jihad, and attitudes towards specific militant organizations. These issues are at the forefront of U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Four results shed new light on the politics of militancy and Islamic identity in Pakistan. First, there is no relationship between measures of personal religiosity and the likelihood a respondent expresses highly sectarian sentiments. Second, militarized jihad is widely seen as legitimate in Pakistan but there are substantial regional differences in the acceptance of militarized jihad. Third, attitudes towards militant groups vary dramatically across groups, particularly when it comes to the efficacy of their actions. Fourth, while Pakistanis express massive levels of support for Sharia law, this is driven by its perceived connection with good governance, not by sympathy with the goals of militant groups claiming to implement it.     

Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan

Policy debates on strategies to end extremist violence frequently cite poverty as a root cause of support for the perpetrating groups. There is little evidence to support this contention, particularly in the Pakistani case. Pakistan's urban poor are more exposed to the negative externalities of militant violence and may in fact be less supportive of the groups. To test these hypotheses we conducted a 6,000‐person, nationally representative survey of Pakistanis that measured affect toward four militant organizations. By applying a novel measurement strategy, we mitigate the item nonresponse and social desirability biases that plagued previous studies due to the sensitive nature of militancy. Contrary to expectations, poor Pakistanis dislike militants more than middle‐class citizens. This dislike is strongest among the urban poor, particularly those in violent districts, suggesting that exposure to terrorist attacks reduces support for militants. Long‐standing arguments tying support for violent organizations to income may require substantial revision.