Book Reviews

Books reviewed in this issue. Daniela Campello, The Politics of Market Discipline in Latin America: Globalization and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Figures, tables, notes, bibliography, index, 239 pp.; hardcover $78.42, paperback $29.99, Kindle $98.40. Eduardo Dargent, Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America: The Experts Running Government. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Tables, figures, bibliography, index. 216 pp.; hardcover $90, ebook $72. Ana Lorena De La O, Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin America: The Quiet Transformation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Figures, tables, bibliography, index, 194 pp.; hardcover $84.99, ebook $68. Jorge Heine and Brigitte Weiffen, 21st Century Democracy Promotion in the Americas: Standing Up for the Polity. New York: Routledge, 2015. Abbreviations, tables, bibliography, index, 196 pp.; hardcover $130, paperback $47. Juan Pablo Luna, Segmented Representation: Political Party Strategies in Unequal Democracies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Tables, maps, figures, bibliography, indexes, 374 pp.; hardcover $115, ebook. Stephen Offutt, New Centers of Global Evangelicalism in Latin America and Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Map, tables, abbreviations, appendixes, bibliography, index, 192 pp.; hardcover $90, ebook $72. Mariela Szwarcberg, Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2015. Figures, tables, maps, notes, bibliography, index, 185 pp.; hardcover $89.99, paperback $32.99, ebook $26. Brian Wampler, Activating Democracy in Brazil: Popular Participation, Social Justice, and Interlocking Institutions. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015. Tables, figures, abbreviations, notes, bibliography, index, 312 pp.; paperback $39, pdf $39. Graham Denyer Willis, The Killing Consensus: Police, Organized Crime, and the Regulation of Life and Death in Urban Brazil. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014. Tables, figures, notes, bibliography, index, 216 pp.; hardcover $70, paperback $29.95, ebook $29.95. Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, Reagan and Pinochet: The Struggle over U.S. Policy Toward Chile. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Abbreviations, acronyms, bibliography, index, 354 pp.; hardcover $95, paperback $34.99, ebook $28.     

Ashley Esarey,Mary Alice Haddad,Joanna I. Lewis,and Stevan Harrell,eds., Greening East Asia: the Rise of the Eco-developmental State

Journal of Chinese Political Science -     

Using the Theory of Planned Behavior to Induce Problem Solving in Schools

A growing body of research suggests that students are able to learn skills of conflict resolution, but rarely apply them in real-world disputes. In this essay, the authors focus on ways to increase the likelihood that students in disputes will use problem-solving techniques rather than resorting to violence. The authors utilize Ajzen's theory of planned behavior (1991) as a guide for identifying antecedents to problem-solving behavior. They alsosuggest means by which these antecedents can be modified to induce constructive problem-solving behavior in school settings.     

National protest agenda and the dimensionality of party politics: Evidence from four East-Central European democracies

Contemporary democracies show considerable differences in the issue composition of their protest politics, which tends to remain relatively stable over time. In countries like Germany or the Czech Republic, the vast majority of protests have been mobilised around sociocultural issues, such as human rights, peace, nuclear power or the environment, and only a tiny portion of protest has focused on economic issues. At the opposite extreme, protest in France or Poland usually has a strongly economic character and voices demands relating to material redistribution and social policy. What lies behind the cross-country differences in national protest agendas? In this article, the national protest agenda depends on what issues mainstream political parties are contesting: the content and strength of the master-issue dimension. In reference to the literature on the multidimensional political space and niche political parties, one should expect that there is a substitutive effect; where the stronger a specific master-issue dimension is in party politics, the less salient that issue dimension is in protest politics. This substitutive effect results from the tendency of electoral politics to reduce political conflict to a single-dimension equilibrium, which decreases the importance of other issues and relegates the contest over secondary, niche issues to the realm of policy-seeking strategies, with protest being a common type of this political strategy. In party systems where single-dimension equilibrium does not exist and the master-issue dimension is weaker, the same dynamics result in a more convergent relationship between party and protest politics and a greater similarity between the protest- and party-system agendas. To investigate this theory, the national protest agendas in four countries are examined. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia show four combinations of two crucial factors that are not available in the old Western democracies: the content and the strength of the master-issue dimension. The study draws on an original dataset of protest events organised in the four countries between 1993 and 2010, and on qualitative and quantitative data on issue dimensions of party politics obtained from studies on party politics and expert surveys. The results show that in the Czech Republic, where the master-issue dimension has remained strongly economic, protest has been predominantly sociocultural. In Poland between 1993 and 2001 and Hungary between 1993 and 2006, the master-issue dimensions are strongly sociocultural, while protest is predominantly economic. There is no single-dimension equilibrium in party politics in Slovakia or in post-2001 Poland and mainstream parties compete on both economic and sociocultural issues. Consequently, the substitutive dynamics between party and protest politics is weaker and the issue agendas in party and protest arenas are here more alike.     

Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage

Can civilians caught in civil wars reward and punish armed actors for their behavior? If so, do armed actors reap strategic benefits from treating civilians well and pay for treating them poorly? Using precise geo‐coded data on violence in Iraq from 2004 through 2009, we show that both sides are punished for the collateral damage they inflict. Coalition killings of civilians predict higher levels of insurgent violence and insurgent killings predict less violence in subsequent periods. This symmetric reaction is tempered by preexisting political preferences; the anti‐insurgent reaction is not present in Sunni areas, where the insurgency was most popular, and the anti‐Coalition reaction is not present in mixed areas. Our findings have strong policy implications, provide support for the argument that information civilians share with government forces and their allies is a key constraint on insurgent violence, and suggest theories of intrastate violence must account for civilian agency.