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Andrews L Elster N Gatter R Dvorkan R Horwich TF Jaeger A Klock S Pergament E Pizzulli F Shapiro R Siegler M Smith P Zager S;Illinois Institute of Technology Institute for Science Law Technology Working Group on Reproductive Technologies 《Southern California interdisciplinary law journal》1998,8(1):87-101
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Structure and Process: Examining the Interaction between Bureaucratic Organization and Analytical Requirements
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Stuart Shapiro 《政策研究评论》2017,34(5):682-699
Attempts by politicians to control bureaucratic decisions include both structural (how is the agency making the decision organized?) and procedural (what rules must they follow when making the decision?). But how do these two modes of influence interact? This article examines the interaction between bureaucratic structure and one procedural control, the requirement that agencies conduct an analysis of their decisions prior to their issuance. I look at this interaction in the context of two types of analysis, cost‐benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment. I interview 16 individuals in each field and draw from their experiences of conducting and reviewing more than a thousand analyses. The conduct of analysis is affected by where analysts are placed in agencies. In particular, independence of analysts has a trade‐off. The more independent analysts are, the more likely they can challenge preferred decisions in their agency. But independent analysts are brought into decisions later and their independence may limit their long‐term impacts on agency culture. Despite this trade‐off, analysts expressed a clear preference for independence. The interaction between different controls of bureaucratic behavior is a potentially fruitful line for further research. 相似文献
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What's wrong with the back of the envelope? A call for simple (and timely) benefit–cost analysis
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Observers across the ideological spectrum have criticized benefit–cost analysis for as long as it has been part of the rulemaking process. Still, proponents and detractors agree that analysis has morphed into a mechanism often used by agencies to justify regulatory decisions already made. We argue that a simpler analysis of more alternatives conducted earlier in the regulatory process can resuscitate it as a tool to inform policy. Recognizing that requiring a procedure does not ensure that regulators will follow it, we offer possible remedies, including strengthening or relaxing subsequent review of proposed rules, which raise the cost of circumventing the reform or lower the cost of following it. 相似文献
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Martin Shapiro 《European Law Journal》1996,2(1):26-47
Abstract: The US Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 was engendered by partisan political conflicts. Initially judicial review of administrative rule-making under the act was extremely deferent. In the course of the 1960s and 1970s the federal courts, basing themselves upon the unchanged language of the statute, created a new body of administrative law characterised by very great demands on the agencies and very intrusive judicial review. This transformation was fuelled by partisan realignments, fear of technocracy and desire for greater transparency and popular participation in government decision-making. Because these same forces are now active in relation to the Union, it may be anticipated that similar tendencies toward a demanding procedural law of rule-making and high levels of judicial review will be felt as Union administrative law develops. 相似文献