Sharing the Rewards,Dividing the Costs? The Electoral Consequences of Social Pacts and Legislative Reform in Western Europe

Do electoral pressures provide an explanation for why governments offer pacts to unions and employers rather than acting through legislation when faced with the need to pass potentially unpopular reforms to welfare policies, wages, and labour markets? This article addresses that question by analysing whether governments’ pursuit of pacts affects their vote share and increases the probability that they gain re-election for 16 West European countries between 1980 and 2012. It is found that the presence of social pacts has a significant and positive effect on incumbents’ vote shares at the next election and also results in a higher probability of re-election. These results are conditioned by government type: While all types of governments benefit electorally from pacts, the electoral penalties from the pursuit of unilateral legislation on policy reforms harm single-party majorities the most, minority governments moderately, and coalition majorities the least.     

Social Justice and Moral Reasoning: An Empirical Integration of Two Paradigms in Psychological Research

Distributive and procedural justice are of central importance to past and current theories of the psychology of moral development and the social psychology of justice. In order to explicate the relationships among theories, participants responded to both a measure of moral reasoning and a measure of 15 various justice criteria. Analyses showed that each schema of moral reasoning was significantly predicted by different concerns about social justice. Furthermore, individuals' judgments about justice were best represented by four factors, offering a broader definition of justice in relation to moral schemas. The findings were consistent with Kohlbergian theory; moral reasoning appears to proceed from concerns about self-interest to distributive fairness to procedural justice.     

Procedural Fairness,Blame Attributions,and Presidential Leadership

The removal of the President of the United States from office is a rare and significant event. This study investigated the influence of procedural fairness and blame attributions on punishment and support attitudes during the 1998 impeachment of President Clinton. This study assessed the influence of the procedural fairness of Clinton's behavior, procedural fairness of the Kenneth Starr/Congress investigation, satisfaction with Clinton policies, and blame attributions on punishment attitudes (i.e., whether Clinton should be removed from office) and support attitudes (i.e., whether individuals would vote for Clinton if an election were held today). Both the procedural fairness of Starr/Congress and procedural fairness of Clinton' behavior significantly influenced punishment and support attitudes. Procedural fairness of Clinton had indirect effects on punishment attitudes (through perceived blame of Clinton) and direct effects on support attitudes. Procedural fairness of Starr/Congress had direct effects on both punishment and support attitudes.     

Shared‐equity mortgages,housing affordability,and homeownership

Abstract

Although the homeownership rate rose from 65 percent in 1995 to 69 percent in 2005, this rise appears difficult to sustain. We argue that the development of new shared‐equity mortgages (SEMs) that blur the lines between debt and equity would propel further advances in homeownership. The rationale for these mortgages is that the broad financial markets would value shares in individual housing returns more highly than hard‐pressed prospective homeowners do.

We describe a new class of SEMs and provide survey evidence that most households would prefer them to interest‐only and other currently popular mortgages. Financial simulations confirm the value of the securitized SEMs to investors. We present computations suggesting that an increase in the overall U.S. homeownership rate of between 1% and 1.5% would likely result from the development of SEM markets.     

Woman pullers: pimping and sex trafficking in a Mexican Border City

Much has been written about sex trafficking in the past decade, although empirical studies have remained few. Even less research has been done on those who make a living by facilitating the movement of women and children in the sex industry. This paper is based on a three-year study in Tijuana, Mexico, in which 92 sex trade facilitators were interviewed. Findings suggest a far more complex social process than portrayed by the anti-trafficking literature. Men and women of diverse backgrounds developed niches in Tijuana’s sex industry, by bringing women into contact with customers. This business appeared to be dominated by Mexican entrepreneurs, with no evidence of any systematic collaborations with either local criminal organizations or foreign traffickers. There appeared to be no shortage of women willing to work in the sex industry, suggesting limited prospect for coerced prostitution. Still, a small number of pimps reported using “persuasion” to recruit women of particular types from interior Mexico. Commissions or referral fees were the most common form of income received by pimps for their services, and the rules on how money was to be made and split between sex workers and venue owners appeared well established. While a few respondents could sustain a livelihood through pimping, the majority held other jobs.     

An experimental evaluation of a nationally recognized employment-focused offender reentry program

Objectives

The need for re-entry assistance is widely acknowledged, but specifics about what services actually lead to reduced recidivism are hard to find—at least among rigorous studies. This is a critical issue: at a time when there appears to be unprecedented support for expanding rehabilitative programs for offenders, there is a dearth of rigorously vetted program options from which to choose.

Methods

Collaborating with a nationally known employment-focused reentry program in Southern California, the authors compared employment, housing, and recidivism outcomes of reentering offenders (n?=?217) who were either randomized into the program or simply provided with a list of community resources. This approach was possible because the number of applicants at the time exceeded program capacity. Outcomes were based on self-report interviews conducted 1-year post-randomization and arrest records reflecting a 2-year follow-up period. The follow-up rate for interviews was 87 %.

Results

No significant differences were found for any of the between-group comparisons on any of the major intervention outcomes.

Conclusions

Findings from the study suggest a greater need to apply randomized designs to more carefully evaluate current reentry efforts. Methodological challenges of field experiments are also discussed.     

Managing an on-the-spot lottery in reentry services

Objectives

Describe the authors?? experiences in designing and conducting a randomized field experiment of a community-based, reentry program for ex-offenders.

Methods

Two surveys: one with reentry clients not involved in our outcome evaluation, and a follow-up survey of participants who underwent randomization in order to participate in the outcome study. Qualitative input from program staff and clients were also recorded, supplemented with observations of the authors.

Results

Having a research staff member located at the program site proved to be a key advantage for monitoring frustrations voiced by program staff and prospective clients, thereby allowing for the modification of the selection procedures over time to minimize resistance. Ultimately, the simplest approach proved to be the most acceptable. The importance of certain procedural justice themes were suggested by the survey results and the observed acceptability of our on-the-spot lottery approach to randomization.

Conclusions

The survey results (and our onsite experiences) provided unequivocal evidence that randomization was unpopular, but that resistance can be partially mitigated by adhering to basic principles of procedural justice.