A Survey Analysis of University-Technology Transfer in Israel: Evaluation of Projects and Determinants of Success

The purpose of this study is to examine how technology transfer organizations (TTOs) at Israeli universities evaluate projects and how they perceive the success or failure of these projects once they are selected. We also analyze whether the criteria they use are similar to those employed by venture capitalists and MIT. We find that the decision criteria used by Israeli universities are similar to those employed by venture capitalists and by the relatively entrepreneurially-focused TTO at MIT. The perceived success of a technology transfer project is strongly related to the quality and motivation of the project team. Dimotech, an Israeli TTO that is focused on entrepreneurial startups, appears to place a stronger emphasis on the characteristics of the individuals involved in launching a new venture than the other Israeli TTOs, which are focused on licensing.     

Communal response to criminal behavior in the kibbutz during periods of crisis

This research examines whether the situation of crisis which has been developing in the majority of secular kibbutzim since the eighties has influenced the attitudes of kibbutz members towards criminal behavior. Previously, the kibbutzim were accustomed to dealing with any deviant behavior in their midst, with the exception of serious crime, by means of their own internal control institutions. Our assumption is that there would be a greater tendency among members of kibbutzim in crisis, as compared to those in a situation of stability, to see criminal behavior as a disturbing, even threatening, social phenomenon, and to turn to outside agencies, such as the police. In order to examine this hypothesis, we selected 230 kibbutz members from six well-established secular kibbutzim in the center of the country, which differ from each other with regard to levels of crisis which in turn determined by means of specific economic and social criteria. Our findings show that criminal behavior is more prevalent in the kibbutz than the members themselves believe. The more stable the kibbutz, the more the members continue to rely on their own conventional methods of dealing with criminal behavior, while the more severe the crisis situation, the greater the tendency to pass the responsibility for the offender to outside agencies.     

Rent-seeking behaviour of retaliating agents

This paper has examined a rent-seeking game where the players take a more sophisticated approach to evaluating the potential strategies and counter-strategies of their rivals than in the standard Nash case. We have derived the conditions for the existence of symmetric and nonsymmetric equilibria for the game and derived the properties of these equilibria. Three results merit repeating. First, we find that rent dissipation will not, in general, be complete. Second, and in contrast to much of the traditional literature, we find that the socially optimal result of zero rent-seeking is sometimes a feasible equilibrium outcome for our game. Finally, there exist rent-seeking configurations in which the best play of one of the rivals is to withdraw from the game or, alternatively stated, where it is not optimal for a rival to contest the rent by entering the game. In these nonsymmetric cases it would appear that Tullock's conjecture about the value of preemptive moves remains valid. This is true even when the strategies and counter-strategies available to the players are much more complex than in the traditional Nash approach.As a final point we raise the issue of whether or not it is reasonable to suppose that the players in rent-seeking games will take their strategy and counter-strategy sets to be as large as we have assumed in this paper. Players may well make their moves and counter-moves based upon rules of thumb or other considerations that effectively bound the strategy sets of the players. As well, it may be useful to consider games where players, upon entering the game, commit themselves to a given level of expenditures. Many of these issues are considered in a related paper by the authors.     

No Place to Hide: Intelligence and Civil Liberties in Israel

In its quest for security and under constant threats, the Israeli state has assigned wide-ranging powers to its intelligence services. These powers include deep incursions into individual liberties and privacy, powers of detention and interrogation, as well as involvement in assassinations. To ensure that those powers are only used legally and against real threats, a system of legal controls and parliamentary oversight over the intelligence community has developed incrementally. The article examines the development of intelligence oversight in Israel and analyses its performance and limits. The article begins by examining historical milestones in the development of intelligence oversight, including the Tubianski affair, official assassinations and ‘Committee-X’, and the ‘Bus 300’ affair. It then analyses the 2002 General Security Service Law and the work of the Intelligence Community Disciplinary Court and the Knesset Intelligence Sub-committee. The roles of Commissions of Inquiry and of the State Comptroller are discussed against the background of various intelligence failures and scandals. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of intelligence oversight in Israel.     

Soviet Espionage in Israel, 1973–1991

In June 1967, the Soviet Union abruptly cut off diplomatic relations with Israel and withdrew its embassy staff from Tel-Aviv, including its large KGB Rezidentura. To develop new sources of intelligence in Israel, the KGB recruited under duress hundreds of Russian Jews to spy in Israel in return for allowing their families to leave the Soviet Union. Most of these ‘recruits’ abandoned their task once they reached Israel, leaving Soviet intelligence with only a small number of agents in Israel who were handled by KGB illegal case officers working out of Russian churches. These agents were able to make careers in Israel and obtain some access to confidential military information, but generally failed to reach Israel's inner circle of political and military decision makers. This inner circle was only breached in 1983 by the treachery of a highly placed former Mossad officer who offered his services to the Soviets and became the KGB's best source for secret information deep inside the Israeli government.