Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999

This article examines contrasting claims made by scholars of oil and politics that oil wealth either tends (1) to undermine regime durability or (2) to enhance it. Using cross-sectional time-series data from 107 developing states between 1960 and 1999, I test the effects of oil wealth on regime failure, political protests, and civil war. I find that oil wealth is robustly associated with increased regime durability, even when controlling for repression, and with lower likelihoods of civil war and antistate protest. I also find that neither the boom nor bust periods exerted any significant effect on regime durability in the states most dependent on exports, even while those states saw more protests during the bust. In short, oil wealth has generally increased the durability of regimes, and repression does not account for this effect. Future research focused on the origins of robust coalitions in oil-rich states is most likely to provide fruitful explanations to this puzzle .     

North Korea: The Case for Strategic Entanglement

North Korea is a state shrouded in secrecy, yet it receives an enormous amount of media attention. Its reclusive nature makes analysis difficult and speculative. What is certain is that a dangerous stalemate regarding nuclear weapons has persisted for far too long and is an obstacle to any real change in the political system. History, culture, and ideology all rule the state's actions; it is therefore a mistake to assume North Korean negotiators can act with autonomy. A new and dynamic means to deal with this dilemma should be developed, for the past has demonstrated that threats and demands will not coerce Pyongyang into submitting, in fact, that approach will only exacerbate the problem. An effective means to move beyond the stalemate is needed.     

Secession crises,human welfare and conflict resolution

Violent and persistent inter-group conflict often results from antagonisms that arise between minority groups and central governments over the oppressive treatment of the minority group and over efforts by the minority group to secede from the parent state. The legal principles that have guided international involvement in these secession crises, namely self-determination of peoples and territorial integrity of the state, have not been effective or consistent inducements for resolution or prevention of the outbreak of conflict. This paper considers how international recognition of secessionist claims could be made dependent on whether the relevant minority group or central government lays out the most convincing plans for enhancing the welfare of the population, avoiding exclusionary policies, and promoting inter-group cooperation and stability rather than inter-group conflict and disorder. The authors urge policy makers to develop judgment criteria that reflect knowledge of these concerns to induce conditions more favourable for stability and peace.