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Most estimates of the incumbency advantage and the electoral benefits of previous officeholding experience do not account for strategic entry by high‐quality challengers. We address this issue by using term limits as an instrument for challenger quality. Studying US state legislatures, we find strong evidence of strategic behavior by experienced challengers. However, we also find that such behavior does not appear to significantly bias the estimated effect of challenger experience or the estimated incumbency advantage. More tentatively, using our estimates, we find that 30–40% of the incumbency advantage in state legislative races is the result of “scaring off” experienced challengers.  相似文献   
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“Strong” political parties within legislatures are one possible solution to the problem of inefficient universalism, a norm under which all legislators seek large projects for their districts that are paid for out of a common pool. We demonstrate that even if parties have no role in the legislature, their role in elections can be sufficient to reduce spending. If parties in the electorate are strong, then legislators will demand less distributive spending because of a decreased incentive to secure a “personal vote” via local projects. We estimate that spending in states with strong party organizations is at least 4% smaller than in states where parties are weak. We also find evidence that strong party states receive less federal aid than states with weak organizations, and we theorize that this is because members of Congress from strong party states feel less compelled to secure aid than members from weak party states.  相似文献   
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We develop a model of intraparty candidate selection under partisan electoral competition and voter uncertainty. Candidates for office belong to parties, which are factions of ideologically similar candidates. Each party’s candidate for a general election can be selected either by a “centralized” mechanism that effectively randomizes over possible candidates or by voters in a primary election. The electorate cares about ideology and valence, and both primary and general elections may reveal candidate valences. Our main theoretical result is that while primaries raise the expected quality of a party’s candidates, they may hurt the ex ante preferred party in a competitive electorate by increasing the chances of revealing the opposing party’s candidates as superior. Thus, primaries are adopted in relatively extreme districts where a clear favorite party exists. An empirical analysis of the adoption of direct primaries and the competitiveness of primary elections across U.S. states supports these predictions.  相似文献   
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European and Asian‐Pacific policymakers need to shift from policies based on competition to those based on co‐operation. If European and Asian‐Pacific states are successful in implementing and strengthening new security institutions on the basis of co‐operative behaviour designed to realize absolute gains, then conflict in these two regions may decrease and regional hegemonic competition may not materialize. It is argued that three key factors will determine the viability of any regional security framework. These are reciprocity in security relations, great power support for the security arrangements and reassurance. In this study's comparative evaluation of Europe and the Asia Pacific, the pursuit of absolute gains through a security regime appears to be a better alternative to relative gains strategies which serve to intensify security dilemmas.

In Europe, rules and norms for state behaviour are being extended throughout the continent through the gradual extension of the West European security institutions to Central and East European states. The NACC and the PfP offer to combine the stability of the North Atlantic Alliance with the principles of co‐operative security at a pan‐European level. In the Asia Pacific, the ASEAN Regional Forum represents a positive initial step towards greater security co‐operation among the ASEAN states and their neighbours, and the United States and China need to give the ARF their full support. The difference between the ARF and NACC and the PfP is that the former does not have a history of successful military collaboration behind it, nor a developed security agenda or structure similar to that now supporting the latter two.  相似文献   
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This article contests the conservative revisionism that emphasizes the importance of traditional families, pietistic religion, individual moral virtue, and small government for undergirding democratic self‐government. The first part exposes the conservative misreading of American history and political theory. The second part uses the civic engagement of middle‐ and upper‐class women in 19th‐century America to construct a progressive alternative to conservative narratives. It shows that women did not stay home and focus on the family during the 19th century but instead entered civil society to address the problems created by industrialization, formed social reform movements, built institutions to pursue a social justice agenda, and demanded that the government take an active role in solving public problems. Their civic engagement built on and created social capital, grew out of and produced a sense of civic virtue (defined as public‐spiritedness), and resulted in the demand for progressive government.  相似文献   
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