Dependency and Development in a Globalized World: Looking Back and Forward

The principles of analysis proposed 40 years ago by Cardoso and Faletto in Dependency and Development in Latin America provide a fruitful way to understand divergent patterns of development in the contemporary era of globalization. This set of analytic principles combines a focus on distinct modes of national insertion into the global economy with a focus on the balance of domestic class forces, the capacity of state institutions, and contingent choices by political actors to explain the contrasting developmental fortunes of countries. The contributors to this special issue demonstrate the vitality of these principles by harnessing them to the dual task of explaining how countries respond to the challenges of globalization and the consequences of these responses. The critical, macroscopic, and possibilistic approach to political economy taken by the contributors offers an exciting and powerful way to understand the problems of development in our globalized world.     

Using Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of the Incumbency Advantage

In this article we use a novel research design that exploits unique features of multimember districts to estimate and decompose the incumbency advantage in state legislative elections. Like some existing related studies we also use repeated observations on the same candidates to account for unobserved factors that remain constant across observations. Multimember districts have the additional feature of copartisans competing for multiple seats within the same district. This allows us to identify both the direct office-holder benefits and the incumbent quality advantage over nonincumbent candidates from the same party. We find that the overall incumbency advantage is of similar magnitude as that found in previous studies. We attribute approximately half of this advantage to incumbents' quality advantage over open-seat candidates and the remainder to direct office-holder benefits. However, we also find some evidence that direct office-holder benefits are larger in competitive districts than in safe districts and in states with relatively large legislative budgets per capita.     

The Origins of the ‘Nonmarket Economy’: Ideas,Pluralism & Power in EC Anti‐dumping Law about China

‘Market’ and ‘market economy’ exercise a powerful, even magnetic grip on our collective imagination. But what do we mean by ‘market economy’? Does it make sense to speak of a ‘nonmarket economy’, and if so, what does it mean? How are the ideas of ‘market economy’ and ‘nonmarket economy’ related? Focusing on EC anti‐dumping law, this article seeks to answer these questions. It argues that the legal concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ in EC anti‐dumping law has been socially constructed, by means of relations among a plurality of institutional and normative sites, as part of a changing configuration of legal ideas in specific historical circumstances, and in contexts of political, economic, social, and symbolic power. This argument is articulated in three parts. First, the concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ in EC anti‐dumping law, though drawing on earlier elements, had its main roots in the early Cold War. Second, starting in the 1960s, the GATT multilateral negotiating rounds began to define more specific international rules of the game, but a variety of more localised processes played essential roles as forces of change. Of special importance were, first, the tension between legislative rules and administrative discretion in the United States, and, second, the Europeanisation of foreign trade law in the course of European integration. Third, the EC law concept of ‘nonmarket economy’ was born in the late 1970s. The main reasons were changes in the international anti‐dumping law repertoire, specific ideas in Europe about comparative economic systems, and the perceived emergence of new economic threats, including exports from China.     

Bridging the Realist/Constructivist Divide: The Case of the Counterrevolution in Soviet Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War

The surprising end of the Cold War has led to a debate within international relations (IR) theory. Constructivists have argued that the end of the Cold War is best explained in terms of ideas and agency—specifically Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev's new thinking. A few realists have countered that Soviet material decline was "endogenous" to the new ideas. Can these two theoretical perspectives be reconciled with respect to this case? They can be partially integrated with a path-dependent strategy that places an emphasis on "institutions." Nevertheless, explaining the end of the Cold War largely requires a theory of Soviet foreign policy and its relation to the state. As a former or ossified revolutionary state, Soviet foreign policy for at least several years was largely based on the principle of externalization: outside threats were used to rationalize radical centralization, repression, and the dominance of the Party. In using the USSR's institutionalized legacy as a revolutionary state, Gorbachev acted as a counterrevolutionary and reversed this process with his revolution in foreign policy. In creating a new peaceful international order, he sought—through the "second image reversed"—to promote radical decentralization, liberalization, and the emergence of a new coalition. The case examines how Gorbachev's domestic goals drove his foreign policy from 1985 to 1991.     

Through the Looking Glass: The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President

The controversy surrounding the 1975 Helsinki Final Act made it an enduring issue in the 1976 campaign, and the political backlash against President Gerald R. Ford damaged his electoral chances. Ford's signature of the agreement, his continuation of détente, and his foreign policy more broadly may not have been decisive issues in his contests with Ronald Reagan and then Jimmy Carter, but they certainly were prominent throughout the election. Examining the influence of the Final Act on Ford's election campaign illuminates the extent to which a number of candidates sought to use popular opposition to the agreement to their advantage. Furthermore, it reveals how the 1976 presidential candidates, and Ford in particular, struggled to address growing questions about détente, human rights, and morality in foreign policy. Ford's failure to defend his signature of the Final Act adequately raised concerns about his foreign policy and personal leadership with the electorate.     

Turkish economic development: The first five year plan, 1963–67

This article evaluates the effectiveness of Turkey's First Five Year Development Plan (1963–67) in achieving both its domestic and its international objectives.

A target of 7 per cent for the G.N.P. growth rate was nearly achieved, but individual sectors diverged from the plan. Agricultural and manufacturing output increased only about three‐quarters as fast as planned, while the construction and service industries exceeded the planned rate. In agriculture, neither new investment nor, more important, the dissemination of new techniques proceeded as rapidly as expected. Insufficient amounts of well‐organized investment projects, foreign exchange, and domestic savings (especially in the public sector) impeded the full achievement of the desired manufacturing capacity. In addition to failing to raise public revenue as much as planned, the principal shortcomings in policy formulation and execution were an overvalued currency which necessitated exchange controls and distorted the allocation of resources, the continued reliance on price regulation, and the failure to reform adequately the State Economic Enterprises. Reliance on foreign aid was reduced, but more aid will still be required before sustained growth is achieved.

In spite of these shortcomings, substantial progress was accomplished during the First Plan without the inflationary pressures and other imbalances which characterized the 1950s. However, Turkey could be developed more rapidly if more appropriate policies were followed.