Rethinking agency and structure in the study of regime change

The oscillation of the study of political regime change between voluntarist and structural approaches has increasingly led scholars to seek research strategies for synthesizing the two approaches. This article addresses the conceptual and practical difficulties of achieving such a synthesis by evaluating several strategies for integrating voluntarist and structural factors in the analysis of regime change. It examines competing ways of conceptualizing agency and structure and assesses the varied consequences that different conceptualizations have for explaining regime transformation. The article also analyzes three distinct strategies for integrating agency and structure: the funnel, path-dependent, and eclectic strategies. Each integrative strategy isanchored by a different conceptual base and has characteristic strengths and limitations. The conclusion explores future directions for developing integrative strategies. The authors are listed in alphabetical order and share equal responsibility for the content of this analysis. We appreciate helpful comments and suggestions from Christopher Ansell, Ruth Berins Collier, Michael Bratton, David Collier, Larry Diamond, Giuseppe di Palma, Peter Evans, John Foran, Jeff Goodwin, Tomasz Grabowski, Ernst Haas, Stephan Haggard, Jonathan Hartlyn, Terry Karl, Steven Levitsky Juan Linz, Gerardo Munck, Pierre Ostiguy, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Eric Selbin, Michael Sinatra, Jutta Weldes, Alexander Wendt, and Brendan Works. James Mahoney is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Brown University. He is currently finishing a book that analyzes liberalism and regime change in five Central American countries during the 19th and 20th centuries. Richard Snyder is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has published numerous articles on both regime change and the politics of economic reform. He is currently completing a forthcoming book entitledPolitics after Neoliberalism.     

Equilibrium and efficiency in an organized vote market

We study an organized market for votes, in which trade is directed by a market "specialist". This market mechanism always produces an equilibrium outcome, and whenever vote buying occurs the alternative chosen is Pareto superior to the alternative that would be chosen without trade. We then characterize the equilibrium outcomes in a one-dimensional policy space, and show that if the distribution of ideal points is skewed enough, then the equilibrium with vote buying differs from the equilibrium without vote buying (the median ideal point). This difference reflects the ability of an intense minority to obtain a policy it prefers in exchange for side-payments.     

Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments

Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these models, we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001. These predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties' minimal-integer voting weights. We calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties. In addition, we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts. We find that for parties that join (but did not form) the government, there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts. The party that forms the government (the formateur) receives a substantial "bonus" relative to its voting weight. The latter finding is more consistent with proposal-based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power.     

Examining the link between assault victimization and ADHD among college men

Research on the victimization of college students has gained substantial ground in the past several years. A considerable amount of research has focused on predicting victimization among college women, with few studies focusing exclusively on college men. The current study utilized a large sample of college students to expand the literature on victimization among college men. Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) was examined as a risk factor for experiencing physical and verbal assault victimization within the lifestyles/routine activities context. The results indicated that college men with ADHD experienced assault at significantly higher rates than college men without ADHD. Additionally, ADHD was a significant predictor of both types of assault once other lifestyle and routine activity variables were controlled for statistically. Implications and suggestions for prevention on college and university campuses are discussed along with further research avenues and risk factor inclusion.     

Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes

Whereas most research on the democratic peace has focused on relations within pairs of states, research on the relationship between democratization and armed conflict has centered primarily on the behavior of individual states. Moreover, the existing literature has placed primary emphasis on explaining the effects of democratization on war, rather than military disputes more generally. In this article, we find that certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of such disputes within dyads, even when economic and political relations between states are taken into account. Particularly prone to violence are dyads in which either state undergoes an incomplete democratic transition; that is, a shift from an autocratic to a partially democratic (or anocratic) regime that stalls prior to the establishment of consolidated democratic institutions.