Governments,decentralisation, and the risk of electoral defeat

In the last three decades several countries around the world have transferred authority from their national to their regional governments. However, not all their regions have been empowered to the same degree and important differences can be observed between and within countries. Why do some regions obtain more power than others? Current literature argues that variation in the redistribution of power and resources between regions is introduced by demand. Yet these explanations are conditional on the presence of strong regionalist parties or territorial cleavages. This article proposes instead a theory that links the government’s risk of future electoral defeat with heterogeneous decentralisation, and tests its effects using data from 15 European countries and 141 regions. The results provide evidence that parties in government protect themselves against the risk of electoral defeat by selectively targeting decentralisation towards regions in which they are politically strong. The findings challenge previous research that overestimates the importance of regionalist parties while overlooking differences between regions.     

The governance of the financial action task force: an analysis of power and influence throughout the years

The international fight against money laundering illustrates changes in global governance as a result of the increasingly cross-border nature of crime and the need it creates for all involved to cooperate. The economic priorities and security concerns that surround it contributed to the strong evolution of global governance in this area and the status of anti-money laundering as a shared problem. The creation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), its expansion and cementation throughout the years, is a good example of the many forces working together to responding to the demands of emerging criminal threats and trends. It offers a good illustration of how relationships in global governance have influenced FATF’s priorities and action and ultimately the way in which illicit financial flows are tackled. This analysis offers an overview of FATF’s network across time taking into account the role of states, international organisations, and the private sector in the decision-making processes. It argues that Great Powers – a small, but aligned, group of states of global economic relevance – are responsible for FATF’s direction and the international efforts against illicit financial flows. It suggests, however, that unlike what could be expected, their power is declining following the rise of private sector influence through resourceful, organised and transnational actions e.g. on information sharing.