Fair Play, Political Obligation, and Punishment

This paper attempts to establish that, and explain why, the practice of punishing offenders is in principle morally permissible. My account is a nonstandard version of the fair play view, according to which punishment’s permissibility derives from reciprocal obligations shared by members of a political community, understood as a mutually beneficial, cooperative venture. Most fair play views portray punishment as an appropriate means of removing the unfair advantage an offender gains relative to law-abiding members of the community. Such views struggle, however, to provide a plausible account of this unfairly gained benefit. By contrast, on my account punishment’s permissibility follows more straightforwardly from the fair play view of political obligation: specifically, the rule instituting punishment is itself among those rules with which members of the political community are obliged to comply. For criminal offenders, compliance requires submitting to the prospect of punishment.     

Intergovernmental Organizations,Interaction, and Member State Interest Convergence

This article presents a general theory of how the interaction of state agents within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leads to a convergence in member state interests over time. The theory is based on the notion that, all else being equal, IGOs that facilitate more interaction between individuals from various states are conducive to greater member state interest convergence over time because there are more opportunities for agents from one or more member states to persuade agents from other member states to accept new ideas that affect how they define their states’ interests. I argue that such persuasion does not necessarily have to involve a shift in state identities but can also involve a diffusion of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships. Also, by focusing on IGOs as structures within which state agents interact, I argue against a narrow focus on socialization defined as the induction of new members into community norms. I present three hypotheses regarding which institutional attributes are conducive to member state interest convergence and test them using an original IGO data set. The findings are supportive of my general theory but provide some interesting support for existing theory that runs counter to one of the hypotheses presented here.