Problems associated with the diagnosis of vitality in burned bodies

The most important signs of vitality in burned bodies are soot deposits in the respiratory tract, the esophagus and the stomach as well as elevated CO-Hb values in the blood. But these findings show only that a person was exposed to fire fumes while alive; they are no indicator for vital heat exposure. As the external findings in burned bodies are often not very conclusive due to postmortem consumption by the fire, the internal findings are all the more important. Macroscopic signs that hot fumes were inhaled may be edematous swelling and vesicular detachment of the mucosa in the pharynx, the larynx and/or the upper section of the esophagus. As histological changes in the respiratory tract soot deposits, vesicular detachment of the epithelium, hyperemia and edema of the tracheal and bronchial mucosa as well as increased secretion of mucus have been described. These findings may partly be absent although the victim was alive during the fire, which can make diagnosis more difficult. Especially in peracute deaths vitality findings are usually sparse. The significance of the macroscopic and histological parameters of vitality was systematically investigated on the basis of our own autopsy material from the years 1996-2002 (88 cases) and compared with the statements found in the literature. In our study material, the vitality parameters were incomplete in 23% of the burned corpses. In 3% of the cases the question whether there was an antemortem heat exposure could not be answered.     

Does corruption suppress voter turnout?*

This paper investigates to what extent voters’ perceptions of political corruption affect turnout. In previous research, two opposing views are put forward with regards to the relationship between corruption and turnout. On the one hand, corruption increases turnout because voters either are bought off to participate or because they are mobilized on clean government issues. On the other hand, corruption decreases turnout because presence of corruption corrodes the political system which leads to general cynicism, distrust and voter apathy. In this paper, we contribute to the existing research by adopting a multi-level approach to the relationship between corruption and turnout. We test the hypothesis that voters’ perceptions of corruption dampens turnout but that the effect is conditional upon the corruption context. We test our hypothesis by combining individual-level data and country-level data from 26 countries from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and country-level data from the Quality of Government Data Set. The findings show that perceiving corruption negatively affects turnout, but only in countries with low to medium levels of system corruption.     

Routes and determinants of leaving home: the city of Gothenburg, 1915–1943

This paper deals with the home-leaving of young adults in Gothenburg, Sweden, in the period 1915–1943. We used individual-level panel data from population registers and poll-tax records, taking a competing risk design for the analysis of the determinants of leaving home to marry, or for non-familial living. We found a transitional, marriage-driven pattern of leaving home that neither fits the old context of life cycle service, nor the alternative modern routes out of the parental home into unmarried householdship. Young adults typically stayed at home until they married, although some moved out to temporary non-familial living first. Non-familial living consisted mainly of lodging in another household, but working outside it, which in a way was a forerunner of the modern pattern, in sharp contrast with the remnant of preindustrial times: the flow from rural areas into Gothenburg of teenage women immigrants to become residential domestic servants. Interestingly, we found that the main determinants of home-leaving in studies of modern-day populations were equally important in the population of Gothenburg in 1915–1943. For both young men and young women, having their own resources (employment, earnings) was positively associated with the likelihood of leaving the parental home. We also found clear gender differences. A higher level of human capital of the father was associated with later home-leaving to marry for sons, and earlier leaving for non-familial living for daughters. Lower levels of household income, or the presence of minor siblings or a widowed parent were push factors for non-familial living for daughters. We found no similar push factors for sons.     

Public Administration in Germany: Problems and Potential of a Fragmented Community

What is the discipline of Public Administration (PA) ultimately for? The German community has recently entered new deliberations on this recurrent question, with several papers and workshops addressing the present and future of their national discipline. This article uses original survey data to introduce the views of the German community at large and analyzes intellectual commonalities against a background of institutional fragmentation. It scrutinizes preferences for epistemological positions, research aims, and publication strategies, while also investigating potentials for cooperation through interdisciplinary exchange and theoretical or thematic concordance. The results show a community in intellectual crisis. Faced with fears of decreasing reputation and influence, German PA is still divided about its purpose and separated by disciplinary borders.     

Cognitive dissonance and the effects of Voting Advice Applications on voting behaviour: evidence from the European Elections 2014

ABSTRACT

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) – also known as Voting Engagement Applications – are online tools which inform users about their proximity to party positions before elections by indicating which parties are closest to the policy preferences of the individual voters. Referring to the theory of cognitive dissonance, this article examines the impact of using a VAA on voting behaviour by looking at the effect mechanisms. For the empirical analyses, we draw on data of a two-wave panel study we conducted before the European Elections 2014, thereby focusing on the German VAA – the Wahl-O-Mat. The findings show that irritation emerges if the preferred party is not positioned at the top of the VAA result list. In turn, a strong irritation can lead to a change in vote choice.     

Campaigns and the Selection of Policy-Seeking Representatives

Can voters learn meaningful information about candidates from their electoral campaigns? As with job market hiring, voters, like employers, cannot know the productivity of candidates, especially challengers, when they elect them. The real productivity of representatives only reveals itself after the election. We explore if the information revealed during the “hiring process” is a good signal of the legislative effort of elected representatives. In the incomplete information environment of election campaigns, candidates should turn to credible signals to indicate their “type” to voters. Campaigns—and campaigning—are means by which candidates can, in principle, signal their motivations to voters. Is a candidate’s behavior on the campaign trail informative about his or her behavior and effort as a legislator? Does it, for example, reveal whether a candidate will be more hard working and legislatively active? Using evidence from the European Parliament, we show that campaign activity prior to the election is not related to policy-seeking behavior in the legislature post-election. The finding also holds in two national-level settings and across a variety of measures of legislative effort. Those who campaign harder do seem more likely to win the election, but campaign effort seems to provide a poor guide to what the winner does once elected.     

The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini

Persson and Tabellini (The Economic Effects of Constitutions, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2003) show that presidential regimes and majoritarian election systems have important economic effects. Here, the number of countries is expanded and more recent data is used. In replicating and extending their analyses, we find that the effect of presidential regimes vanishes almost entirely. With regard to electoral systems, the original results are largely confirmed: majoritarian (as opposed to proportional) electoral systems lead to lower government expenditure, lower levels of rent seeking but also lower output per worker. The institutional details, such as the proportion of candidates that are not elected on party lists and district size, are particularly important.     

The European Commission–Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations

The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than that of the Council. This prediction is confirmed for a dataset covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002.