Uncertain Justice for Nuclear Terror: Deterrence of Anonymous Attacks Through Attribution

In light of ongoing work to improve nuclear attribution capabilities, policymakers could be tempted to consider a nuclear terrorism deterrence doctrine relying strongly on the ability of those capabilities to support retaliation against states that supply materials used anonymously in an attack. Although the United States must develop the best possible nuclear attribution capabilities, at the very least to support response actions after an attack, prospects for deterrence are uncertain. To accommodate these uncertainties, as well as the wide range of possible nuclear terrorism scenarios, the United States should adopt a broadly scoped operationally ambiguous declaratory policy in the context of a comprehensive strategic doctrine to prevent nuclear terrorism.     

U.S. Military Fatalities in Iraq in Perspective: Year 4

As year five begins, the prospects for a successful conclusion of the Iraq war - one that would repair the deep seated and deadly animosities throughout civil society, establish a foundation for a sustainable democratic government, and stop the inexorable climb of U.S. fatalities above 3,000 and of total casualties toward 30,000 and beyond - are remote. The U.S. is embroiled in a conflict in three dimensions, military political and civil, that defies solution. Our military and its leaders have tended to underestimate the enemy and engage it half-heartedly, while the insurgents have retained freedom of action and repeatedly seized the initiative. The fourth dimension, the battle for Iraqi hearts and minds, essential for bringing hostilities to an end, has not even begun.     

Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11

This paper focuses on the relationship between International Relations theory and ethics. It poses the question of the complicity of the discipline in the events of September 11, 2001. The paper begins with a discussion of Weber's notion of science as a vocation, and links this to the commitment in the discipline to a value-free conception of social science, one that sharply separates facts from values. The paper then examines the role of ten core assumptions in International Relations theory in helping to construct a discipline that has a culturally and historically very specific notion of violence, one resting on distinctions between economics and politics, between the outside and the inside of states, and between the public and the private realms. Using the United Nations Human Development report, the paper summarizes a number of forms of violence in world politics, and questions why the discipline of International Relations only focuses on a small subset of these. The paper then refers to the art of Magritte, and specifically Velazquez's painting Las Meninas, to argue for a notion of representation relevant to the social world that stresses negotiation, perspective, and understanding rather than notions of an underlying Archimedean foundation to truth claims. In concluding, the paper asserts that the discipline helped to sing into existence the world of September 11 by reflecting the interests of the dominant in what were presented as being neutral, and universal theories.     

Into the Great Wide Open: The Transformation of the German Armed Forces After 1990

The German military has gone through fundamental changes since Reunification in 1990. Not only did its obvious enemy disappear, but the basis for what had been a partnership of convenience between German society and the Bundeswehr eroded. Since then, successive German governments have tried to find ways to transform strategic concepts, military structures, and international commitments to fit the new international relations and security challenges at the beginning of the twenty-first century. These transformation efforts have been affected both by cultural restraints and by economic ones. Instead of just following one new and simple strategic concept, the transformation of the Bundeswehr had to be oriented towards military structures that were politically and financially feasible. Despite the progress achieved on the operational level, Germany is still lacking a clear strategic concept for the use of force and the engagement of the Bundeswehr.