Strategic Challenger Entry in a Federal System: The Role of Economic and Political Conditions in State Legislative Competition

Over a third of state legislators do not face challengers when seeking reelection. Existing analyses of state legislative contestation almost exclusively focus on the stable institutional features surrounding elections and ignore conditions that change between elections. I remedy this oversight by investigating how political contexts influence challenger entry. State legislators—particularly members of the governor's party—more often face opposition during weak state economies, but the president's copartisans are even more likely to receive a challenger when the president is unpopular. My findings suggest that both national‐ and state‐level political conditions have an important impact on challengers' entry strategies.     

Differences in Handwritings of Schizophrenia Patients and Examination of the Change after Treatment

The aim of this study was to analyze the differences between the handwritings of schizophrenia patients and healthy subjects in addition to the changes that occurred in schizophrenia patients' handwriting in response to the treatment. The test subjects were 29 schizophrenia patients and 29 healthy individuals with the same age, gender, and dominant hand. The changes in the handwritings were examined according to 14 different parameters. On the day of admittance, the percentage of extra letters was 16.7%, and after 7–10 days of hospitalization, it rose to 33.3%. The percentage of skipped words decreased from 29.2% to 16.7% after 7–10 days of hospitalization, and to 10% after 3 weeks. The letters written by schizophrenia patients are significantly larger in height and width compared to the control group. The schizophrenia patients showed a higher incidence of crossed-out letters, adding extra words, missing punctuation as well as missing words.     

The Distribution of the Armenian Abandoned Properties in an Ottoman Locality: Kayseri (1915–18)

Abandoned properties of the deportee Armenians is a new topic in the literature which began to attract the interest of scholars. As a general tendency, most of the related studies focused on the evaluation of the rules and regulations on the abandoned properties. Even though it is important to take legal framework into consideration, this article would rather focus on the analysis of the actual process in an Ottoman locality, Kayseri. By doing this, it tries to go beyond presenting the ‘mentality’ of the ruling elite, and construct the actual history of the process. In the first part of the article, the studies on the abandoned properties would be analyzed, and in the second part, the distribution of the Armenian abandoned properties in the sanjak of Kayseri would be detailed.     

The paradox of grading systems

We distinguish between (i) voting systems in which voters can rank candidates and (ii) those in which they can grade candidates, using two or more grades. In approval voting, voters can assign two grades only—approve (1) or not approve (0)—to candidates. While two grades rule out a discrepancy between the average-grade winners, who receive the highest average grade, and the superior-grade winners, who receive more superior grades in pairwise comparisons (akin to Condorcet winners), more than two grades allow it. We call this discrepancy between the two kinds of winners the paradox of grading systems, which we illustrate with several examples and whose probability we estimate for sincere and strategic voters through a Monte Carlo simulation. We discuss the tradeoff between (i) allowing more than two grades, but risking the paradox, and (ii) precluding the paradox, but restricting voters to two grades.