Should Egalitarians be Perfectionists?

Political philosophers often worry about the potentially elitist implications of perfectionism as the basis of distributive justice. Richard Arneson challenges this familiar connection between perfectionism and elitism by developing an egalitarian theory of distributive justice with distinctively perfectionist grounds. In this article, I argue that Arneson's theory is implausible, because an egalitarian political morality renders perfectionism either irrelevant or arbitrary.     

Setting Agendas and Designing Alternatives: Policymaking and the Strategic Role of Meetings1

This paper investigates the role of strategic forums—such as special commissions, task forces, roundtables, working groups, summits—in the policy process. Reviewing prominent theories about policymaking, the author suggests ways in which strategic forums might fit within these frameworks as an analytically distinct policy lever. The paper examines existing literature on such forums, and identifies characteristics of “meetings that matter”—those gatherings that appear to have achieved some policy traction in a given domain. Finally, the paper investigates a particular field, cultural policy, to evaluate the extent to which meetings are serving policy purposes. The author concludes that meetings can serve an important role in the policy process by framing public problems and highlighting policy alternatives; creating and sustaining policy communities; fostering policy transfer and knowledge uptake; and developing networks among policy entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, with regard to cultural policy, the author argues that, compared to other policy domains, strategic policy-focused convenings are not a regular part of the arts and culture landscape and remain underused policy tools.     

Law versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct

It is evident that both law and morality serve to channel ourbehavior. Law accomplishes this primarily through the threatof sanctions if we disobey legal rules. Morality too involvesincentives: bad acts may result in guilt and disapprobation,and good acts may result in virtuous feelings and praise. Thesetwo very different avenues of effect on our actions are examinedin this article from an instrumental perspective. The analysisfocuses on various social costs associated with law and morality,and on their effectiveness, as determined by the magnitude andlikelihood of sanctions and by certain informational factors.After the relative character of law and of morality as meansof control of conduct is assessed, consideration is given totheir theoretically optimal domains—to where moralityalone would appear to be best to control behavior, to wheremorality and the law would likely be advantageous to employjointly, and to where solely the law would seem desirable toutilize. The observed pattern of use of morality and of lawis discussed, and it is tentatively suggested that the observedand the optimal patterns are in rough alignment with one another.     

Farmer-to-farmer extension: opportunities for enhancing performance of volunteer farmer trainers in Kenya

Farmer-to-farmer extension (FFE) is playing a complementary role to formal extension services in facilitating the spread of agricultural technologies and improving farmers’ capacities. The effectiveness and sustainability of such programmes depend on volunteer farmer trainers (VFTs) having technical skills and overcoming process-related challenges that hinder them from achieving the desired outcomes. This article uses quantitative and qualitative data collected from seven sites to explore the challenges experienced by VFTs as they share their knowledge on livestock feed innovations in a dairy development project in Kenya. Sustainable opportunities for enhancing VFTs’ performance are discussed.     

Sex Determination by Discriminant Function Analysis of Lumbar Vertebrae

Sex determination is critical for developing the biological profile of unidentified skeletal remains. When more commonly used elements (os coxa, cranium) for sexing are not available, methods utilizing other skeletal elements are needed. This study aims to assess the degree of sexual dimorphism of the lumbar vertebrae and develop discriminant functions for sex determination from them, using a sample of South African blacks from the Raymond A. Dart Collection (47 males, 51 females). Eleven variables at each lumbar level were subjected to univariate and multivariate discriminant function analyses. Univariate equations produced classification rates ranging from 57.7% to 83.5%, with the highest accuracies associated with dimensions of the vertebral body. Multivariate stepwise analysis generated classification rates ranging from 75.9% to 88.7%. These results are comparable to other methods for sexing the skeleton and indicate that measures of the lumbar vertebrae can be used as an effective tool for sex determination.     

Strategic Challenger Entry in a Federal System: The Role of Economic and Political Conditions in State Legislative Competition

Over a third of state legislators do not face challengers when seeking reelection. Existing analyses of state legislative contestation almost exclusively focus on the stable institutional features surrounding elections and ignore conditions that change between elections. I remedy this oversight by investigating how political contexts influence challenger entry. State legislators—particularly members of the governor's party—more often face opposition during weak state economies, but the president's copartisans are even more likely to receive a challenger when the president is unpopular. My findings suggest that both national‐ and state‐level political conditions have an important impact on challengers' entry strategies.     

The paradox of grading systems

We distinguish between (i) voting systems in which voters can rank candidates and (ii) those in which they can grade candidates, using two or more grades. In approval voting, voters can assign two grades only—approve (1) or not approve (0)—to candidates. While two grades rule out a discrepancy between the average-grade winners, who receive the highest average grade, and the superior-grade winners, who receive more superior grades in pairwise comparisons (akin to Condorcet winners), more than two grades allow it. We call this discrepancy between the two kinds of winners the paradox of grading systems, which we illustrate with several examples and whose probability we estimate for sincere and strategic voters through a Monte Carlo simulation. We discuss the tradeoff between (i) allowing more than two grades, but risking the paradox, and (ii) precluding the paradox, but restricting voters to two grades.     

Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach

Public Choice - To ameliorate ideological or partisan cleavages in councils and legislatures, we propose modifications of approval voting in order to elect multiple winners, who may be either...