Government contracting and procurement: a critical process for both the public and private sectors

The costs and benefits of government purchases of goods and services from businesses are examined from the perspective of both public and private sector officials. Generally, governments see more benefits than costs, often because of fiscal stress. Businesses, especially newer, smaller firms are more likely to see more costs than benefits. The article concludes with ten projections for changes in public procurement systems by the year 2000. These are: (1) expansion of current vendor pools; (2) intergovernmental adoption of standardized forms and procedures for getting and staying on government vendor lists; (3) mainstreaming of purchasing into the government financial management decision-making loop; (4) more rigorous training requirements for government purchasing personnel; (5) greater use of public-private task forces to reform procurement policies and practices; (6) greater use of surveys inside and outside government to identify specific problem areas and structure reforms; (7) expansion of the auditing and contract monitoring section of purchasing departments; (8) extension of bidding/contract monitoring and evaluation requirements and procedures to subcontractors of prime government contractors; (9) greater efforts to include quality dimensions in cost estimates; and (10) more tension and litigation over “protectionism” in public procurement.     

Procurement policy: The missing element in financial management education

This study emphasizes the need to include purchasing, or procurement, as a topic in the graduate-level public administration curriculum. It notes the absence of purchasing research in mainstream public administration journals and in leading public financial management textbooks. The study also reports the results of a survey mailed to the purchasing directors of the 46 largest U.S. counties outside Florida. The survey was designed to familiarize academians and practitioners with various administrative, legal, structural, and procedural dimensions of county procurement policies. Areas of greatest deficiency are those dealing with protest and appeals procedures and contract monitoring, and to a lesser extent procedures for declaring an emergency, entering into intergovernmental purchasing agreements, and contracting with minority businesses. The most comprehensively-covered elements are those delineating award authority, small purchase authority, methods of soliciting bids, definitions of emergencies and professional services, and procedures for contracting professional services.     

Health strategy and development planning: Lessons from the people's republic of China

In Section I of this paper we present an analytical paradigm by which to evaluate health and medical care services in underdeveloped countries. In Section II, we apply this framework to an analysis of the health policies of one developing country, China. In Section III, we evaluate the Chinese health and medical care policies within the framework of a cost‐benefit analysis and argue that these policies are appropriate to China's factor proportions and health needs. Finally, in Section IV, we raise a number of questions to be considered in any more detailed studies on the transferring of the Chinese services to other developing countries.     

How electoral incentives shape performance measurement efforts

Although scholars have assessed how the electoral connection of legislators and chief executives affects their support for performance measurement, we know less about how electoral considerations might influence agency administrators’ focus on performance measurement. I suggest that independently elected administrators’ attention to their agency's performance measurement system may be conditional on the likelihood that their efforts in this area will help them realize their electoral goals. Because there is a greater electoral incentive to focus on performance issues when government performance is deficient, elected administrators should be as likely as, if not more likely than, their non‐elected counterparts to focus on performance measurement when the government is performing poorly and less likely to do so when the government is performing well. I find evidence that supports this expectation. This article provides insight into the implications of electoral incentives for management decisions.