Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies

Theorists assert that international capital mobility creates substantial pressure for all democratically elected governments to decrease tax burdens on business. I explicate and critique the general version of this theory and offer an alternative view. Empirically, I explore whether or not the globalization of capital markets has resulted in decreases in business social security, payroll, and profit taxes. I also investigate whether or not capital mobility has intensified government responsiveness to domestic investment and profitability. Evidence suggests that business tax burdens have not been reduced in the face of rises in capital mobility nor is tax responsiveness to profitability and domestic investment intensified by more open capital markets. To the contrary, analyses indicate that business taxation has become subject to new 'market conforming' policy rules that developed in tandem with liberalization of markets. These new policy orientations reduce the economic management roles of business taxation while leaving the revenue-generating roles intact. In conclusion, I discuss the implications of the findings for questions concerning the structural power of internationally mobile capital, redistributive policies, and the autonomy of democratically elected governments in a global economy.     

Criminal justice education: The dilemma of articulation

There exists a major problem for criminal justice students in transferring from the two- to four-year institution. This article addresses the historical foundation of this dilemma and provides a path toward solution.     

Learning and signalling by advisor selection

In this paper we consider a model where a policy maker uses advice in order to (1) obtain information about the consequences of an innovation (information motive) and (2) to support political legitimacy of her decision (persuasion motive). We conduct our analysis in the context of a cheap-talk game with three players: (1) a policy maker, (2) the median voter in parliament or of the electorate and (3) an advisor. The advisor has private information about the consequences of policy. Communication between an advisor and a recipient improves as their preferences are closer aligned. If the preferences of the policy maker and the median voter are different the policy maker faces a trade-off. On the one hand, she wants to gain information to judge whether the innovation is worthwhile. On the other hand, she needs to convince the median voter whether the innovation is desirable.     

Budgetary Devices for Curbing Spending Prone Ministers and Bureaucrats

In this paper I study asimple game of the budgetary process. Thegame has three players. A spending proneminister, who proposes a budget, a primeminister, who accepts or vetoes, and abureaucrat who provides non-verifiableinformation about policy. The bureaucratis appointed by the spending minister. Ishow that in this setting public spendingis excessive. This result stems from theproposal power of the minister, and hisincentive to appoint a spending pronebureaucrat. Next, I examine two devices forcontrolling public spending: binding budgettargets imposed by the prime minister, anddelegating veto power to a spending aversefinance minister. It is shown that thelatter device is more effective than theformer device to curb a spending proneminister, because it not only reduces theproposal power of the spending minister,but also induces him to appoint lessspending prone bureaucrats.     

Conduct Problems Among Children at Battered Women's Shelters: Prevalence and Stability of Maternal Reports

The present research was designed to (1) replicate prevalence estimates of clinical levels of conduct problems in a large (n = 401) sample of children residing at a shelter for battered women, and (2) assess the stability of mothers' reports of child conduct problems following shelter departure. According to mothers' reports on standardized questionnaires and diagnostic interviews obtained during shelter residence, approximately one third of the children between 4 and 10 years of age exhibited clinical levels of conduct problems. Prior research has demonstrated elevated maternal distress during shelter residence and suggests that such distress may influence mothers' reports of child conduct problems. To examine this issue, a subset of families with children exhibiting clinical levels of conduct problems (n = 68) was reassessed following their shelter departure. Mothers' reports of child conduct problems remained stable despite significant reductions in mothers' distress after shelter exit.     

Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic?

This paper examines whether partisan and opportunistic motives affect government expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953–1993, allows for different types of government spending. In general, spending is inspired by ideological and opportunistic motives: all government expenditure categories show an upward drift during election times and the ‘partisan’ motives behind government spending are clearly revealed: left-wing cabinets attach greater importance to social security and health care than right-wing cabinets and right-wing cabinets value expenditure on infrastructure and defense more than left-wing parties.