Block Grants: A Perennial, But Unstable, Tool of Government

During 1995 and 1996, the Congress and the president gave considerableattention to block granting over $200 billion in federal intergovernmentalgrant programs, ranging from large entitlement programs to smallerprograms in housing, vocational education, and law enforcement.In the end, the record of successes was modest—highlightedby welfare-reform legislation that, in some respects, resembleda block grant and in others did not. The contrast between processand outcomes in this most recent block-grant cycle reinforcesthe point that block-grant prospects depend on fundamental fiscal,political, and programmatic forces that are separate from federalismconsiderations. The states' maturation as leaders in many domesticpolicy areas strengthens the performance rationale for blockgrants. The federal fiscal crisis will continue to stimulateinterest in block grants among fedeal as well as state policymakers.The proposals offering the greatest fiscal advantage (i.e.,Medicaid and AFDC) may not be those with the strongest performancerationale. Although recent congressional developments suggeststronger support for states, nationalizing forces remain embeddedin domestic policymaking. Thus, substantial questions remain,posing obstacles to a fundamental and sustained role for blockgrants in the federal system.     

European Integration and Citizens' Rights: A Comparative Perspective

The prospects for European Union citizenship are sometimes discountedby reference to homogeneity in the United States compared todiversity in the European Union. This article suggests thatthere may be more similarities between the two systems thanis sometimes supposed by many observers. Even though there areimportant differences, both systems have had to address similarquestions about how to combine the benefits of integration andthe protection of rights. In discussing the common and divergentfeatures, the author argues that comparison also reveals thepossibility that it is diversity, not homogeneity, that is necessaryto the protection of citizenship's rights.     

If people vote because they like to, then why do so many of them lie?

Of those eligible, about 40% do not vote in presidential elections. When asked, about a quarter of those nonvoters will lie to the survey takers and claim that they did. Increases in education are associated with higher voting rates and lower rates of lying overall, but with increased rates of lying conditional on not voting. This paper proposes a model of voter turnout in which people who claim to vote get praise from other citizens. Those who lie must bear the cost of lying. The model has a stable equilibrium with positive rates of voting, honest non-voting, and lying. Reasonable parameter changes produce changes in these proportions in the same direction as the changes actually observed across education levels. I argue that a model where people vote because they want to be known as voters provides a better explanation for observed voting behavior than does a model where people vote because they want to vote.     

Insurgency, counterinsurgency, and the rational peasant

Many rational choice treatments of guerrilla insurgency have focused on the strategic calculus by which government and insurgent elites use the tactical weapons of coercion and benefits to win the support of nonelites. This paper uses Frohlich and Oppenheimer's model of the rational tax payer/tax evader to develop a model of the decision calculus by which nonelites respond to the tactical behavior of elites and thereby choose between supporting the incumbent regime, its insurgent opposition or neither. This model is then used to assess the likely impact of various insurgent and counterinsurgent tactics on nonelite support and loyalty.     

Just Social Policy on Life Issues: Ethical Considerations

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." These words from the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence, proclaimed a conviction and announced a challenge for our newly formed nation. Today, they either stir the American heart with pride or generate nostalgia for a time when any truth was self-evident and the right to life was deemed inalienable.     

Economics and distributive ethics

This essay, adapted from his Inaugural Lecture as the Simon Professor at Lafayette, was dedicated to the memory of Aaron Wildavsky.     

The fragile politics of addiction

Suppose the optimizing consumer only has local information, then what? Obviously, there will be a random element of consumption. The link between the frequency distribution of consumption by person and preference surface is worked out. Under convex preferences there will be a unimodal distribution and conversely. A local optimizing theory of addictive behavior is developed from nonconvex preferences. The resulting bimodal distribution of consumption implies a nonrobust outcome for median voter politics. Such a local optimizing model of addiction is compared with globally optimizing models of addiction.