Urban policy-making: shortcomings in political technology

Abstract. The urban crisis has typically been explained as a conjuncture of severe problems in large urban areas. As such, these problems ought to be amenable to solutions by public authorities, yet the record has been unimpressive. If part of the reason is the intrinsic complexity of the issues, another factor appears to be the available political technology. This paper suggests that there are two types of shortcoming in that technology which play key roles. The first is the direction-setting mechanisms of government, which are essentially partial, static, and reactive, whereas the policy requirements of an urban society are holistic, dynamic and innovative. The former views efficiency as the objective of policy, yet the pursuit of efficiency within such a framework can lead to growing ineffectiveness or irrelevance. The second type of shortcoming is found in the evolving structure of the public sector. The growing importance of senior level governments, in part a logical consequence of the efficiency bias, has led to yet greater irrelevance. This is due to the growing distance from local preferences, and to the introverted process of goal setting within senior levels of government. Institutional reform is thus an essential precondition for the development of relevant urban policy. Sommaire. De façon typique, la crise urbaine a été expliquée comme étant la convergence de problèmes graves, dans les grandes régions urbaines. Si tel est le cas, les autorités publiques devraient pouvoir leur apporter des solutions et pourtant les résultats obtenus n'ont rien de spectaculaires. Cela est dû en partie à la complexité intrinsèque des problèmes, mais il semble que l'autre raison responsable de cet échec soit la technologie politique actuelle. L'auteur de cette communication pense qu'il y a deux types de faiblesses dus à cette technologie. Le premier concerne les mécanismes d'orientation gouvernementaux, qui sont essentiellement limités, statiques et réactifs alors que les impératifs des politiques gouvernant les sociétés urbaines sont globaux, dynamitiques et innovateurs. Avec le premier système, l'efficacité est l'objectif des politiques, mais la poursuite de l'efficacité dans un tel contexte peut entraîner une inefficacité croissante ou un manque de pertinence. Le second type de faiblesse se trouve dans l'évolution de la structure du secteur public. L'importance croissante des niveaux supérieurs du gouverne-ment, en partie conséquence logique de l'importance accordée à l'efficacité, a fait perdre encore de la pertinence. Cela vient de la manifestation de plus en plus lointaine des préférences locales et du processus inversé pour fixation des objectifs am niveaux supérieurs du gouvemement.     

隐形知识的转型:马来西亚华人家族制造业研究

马来西亚华人家族企业文化的特征是以"家"作为其管理模式,是一种集企业文化与权威于一体的家族文化。在"家族至上"的意识下,企业的成员和个体完全归属于家族,个人利益也须服从于家族利益,一切都以家族利益为重。所有的家族成员都有义务尽全力去追求家族的兴旺、发达和荣耀。家族成员都身居要职,掌握着家族企业的隐性知识和核心秘密。由于马来西亚华人家族的利益和企业利益的高度一致,因此他们都会严守秘密,创新其组织,因而制造出利基产品(Niche Product)而使本身企业在激烈的竞争中立于不败之地。当马来西亚华人中小型家族企业(SMEs)经历世代交替之际,这些华人企业却鲜少着重于如何发展其创办人的隐性知识。然而,为确保企业的永续发展,马来西亚华人企业的新一代已开始将隐性知识更加具体化,培育和创新其企业管理、进行企业改革和改善企业的行销技巧。     

Post-revolutionary State Building in Ethiopia, Iran and Nicaragua: Lessons from Terror

This paper focuses on an earlier theorized critical stage of revolution, the Reign of Terror which is redefined with summary justice as its essence and employed in a comparative analysis of three modern revolutions, Ethiopia, Iran and Nicaragua. The analysis demonstrates the importance of national factors over international factors in explaining post-revolutionary state construction. A reign of terror is an extemporized state; it is not an inevitable stage of revolution. Comparison of Ethiopia and Iran, where terrors occurred, is contrasted with Nicaragua, where a reign of terror was avoided. This reveals the significance for post-revolutionary state construction of the timing and outcome of civil war, of domestic policy choices constrained by circumstances directly encountered and of state control over new, revolutionary, means of coercion.     

Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War

Aerial bombardment has been an important component of counterinsurgency practice since shortly after it became a viable military technology in the early twentieth century. Due to the nature of insurgency, bombing frequently occurs in and around settled areas, and consequently it tends to generate many civilian casualties. However, the effectiveness of bombing civilian areas as a military tactic remains disputed. Using data disaggregated to the level of the smallest population unit and measured at multiple points in time, this article examines the effect of aerial bombardment on the pattern of local control in the Vietnam War. A variety of estimation methods, including instrumental variables and genetic matching, show that bombing civilians systematically shifted control in favor of the Viet Cong insurgents.