首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   7683篇
  免费   148篇
各国政治   177篇
工人农民   730篇
世界政治   352篇
外交国际关系   278篇
法律   4843篇
中国政治   24篇
政治理论   1404篇
综合类   23篇
  2023年   37篇
  2020年   59篇
  2019年   77篇
  2018年   517篇
  2017年   524篇
  2016年   429篇
  2015年   84篇
  2014年   93篇
  2013年   415篇
  2012年   196篇
  2011年   473篇
  2010年   509篇
  2009年   367篇
  2008年   386篇
  2007年   389篇
  2006年   124篇
  2005年   99篇
  2004年   136篇
  2003年   134篇
  2002年   89篇
  2001年   208篇
  2000年   208篇
  1999年   149篇
  1998年   63篇
  1997年   65篇
  1996年   64篇
  1995年   75篇
  1994年   75篇
  1993年   52篇
  1992年   118篇
  1991年   106篇
  1990年   132篇
  1989年   121篇
  1988年   136篇
  1987年   129篇
  1986年   100篇
  1985年   106篇
  1984年   86篇
  1983年   79篇
  1982年   56篇
  1981年   47篇
  1980年   40篇
  1979年   56篇
  1978年   38篇
  1977年   27篇
  1976年   30篇
  1975年   28篇
  1974年   39篇
  1973年   29篇
  1970年   27篇
排序方式: 共有7831条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
221.
222.
223.
224.
This paper tests whether the political connections of banks were important in explaining participation in the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending programs during the recent financial crisis. Our multivariate tests show that banks that were politically connected—either through lobbying efforts or employment of politically connected individuals—were substantially more likely to participate in the Federal Reserve’s emergency loan programs. In economic terms, participation in these programs was 28–36% more likely for banks that were politically connected than for banks that were not politically connected. In our final set of tests, we attempt to identify a proper explanation for this peculiar relationship. While a broad literature speaks of the moral hazard associated with receiving bailouts, we test whether another type of moral hazard exists in the period preceding the bailout. In particular, we argue that, to the extent that political connections act as synthetic insurance, banks may have engaged in more risky behavior that lead them to the Fed’s emergency lending facilities. Tests seem to confirm this explanation.  相似文献   
225.
226.
Pay for performance (PFP) remains one of the most controversial policy debates in the New Public Management reform era. Skepticism about PFP in the public sector is often grounded in theories of public service motivation that suggest a misalignment between PFP's focus on extrinsic market‐based pay incentives and intrinsically motivated government workers. Frequently missing from this analysis, however, is any consideration for whether PFP leads to positive “sorting” effects on the composition of a government agency's workforce through attraction, selection, and attrition processes. Using data from two waves of the Schools and Staffing Survey, the authors examine whether PFP influences the sorting patterns of K–12 public schoolteachers across U.S. school districts. Findings show that, on average, school districts that adopted PFP secured new teacher hires who had graduated from colleges and universities with average SAT scores that were about 30 points higher than the new teacher cohorts hired by districts that did not adopt PFP.  相似文献   
227.
When agencies regulate, they must calculate the costs and benefits of their regulations. To do this, they must often price non-market goods—for instance, the value of protecting wildlife or the environment. Regulators have typically relied upon contingent valuation surveys to put prices on these types of goods. But contingent valuation surveys are fraught with error and often give rise to implausible valuations that cannot be trusted. Quadratic voting offers a better solution. Agencies should hold quadratic votes over nonmarket goods and use those votes to price the goods at issue.  相似文献   
228.
229.
230.
Although interest in research utilization in the policy process has grown, how advocates strategically deploy different types of evidence to influence lawmakers remains not well understood. In this paper, we draw on the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Narrative Policy Framework to show how various types of evidence—from empirical findings to personal anecdotes—were utilized by advocates during the 2 years leading to the passage of California’s historic 2010 law to extend foster care. The result was a generous and flexible entitlement policy passed with bipartisan support in the context of a recession, a state budget deficit, and an ambivalent governor. We find that leaders of a diverse advocacy coalition strategically showcased different types of evidence at specific moments in the legislative process. Each evidence type can be tied to a specific narrative element and strategy. Advocates first used research evidence to convince lawmakers of the policy’s effectiveness, then used professional expertise and benefit-cost analysis to convince them it would come at an acceptable cost, and finally used personal narratives to motivate them to act. We conclude that though benefit-cost analyses play an integral role in policymaking during a time of austerity, advocacy coalitions may still benefit from personal stories that lend emotional potency and urgency.  相似文献   
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号