Internet Regulation Process Model: The Effect of Societies,Communities, and Governments

The Internet is often seen as borderless and unmanageable and, therefore, not fully understandable. Starting from the assumption that it can be understood, we begin an attempt to organize the Internet by characterizing it as a behavior space in which groups categorized as societies, communities, and governments interact. We emphasize the utility of organizing the Internet and focus specifically on attempts by societies, communities, and governments to regulate the flow of information. We posit an Internet regulation process model that, we believe, explains most of the efforts to regulate the Internet. In addition, we provide some insight into the relationships between and within the various groups involved. Our conclusions center on the observation that political power (especially Western political power) has been a defining factor in the regulation of the Internet as governments have played a prominent role in regulatory action.     

A DUAL‐SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENTIAL SUSCEPTIBILITY TO PROCESSES OF PEER INFLUENCE

The distinct peer‐based perspectives of deviant normative influence and unstructured/unsupervised socializing with friends contend that adolescents rely on different information when deciding to offend, with the former positing that individuals offend after considering the longer term consequences of behavior, and the latter positing that decisions to offend derive from situational stimuli. We argue that these processes can be organized under a dual‐systems framework of decision making, which leads to the hypothesis that individuals at the edges of impulsivity should be differentially vulnerable to these peer influence processes because of their tendency to rely on only one system of decision making. We use two large data sets to test this hypothesis: a nationally representative sample of adolescents from the AddHealth study (N = ～9,000) and a pooled panel data set of adolescents from the Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) evaluation (N = 1,172). The results of longitudinal negative binomial analyses indicate that normative influence by deviant peers has a stronger effect on delinquency for adolescents with low impulsivity than it does for individuals with high impulsivity. Differences in the informal socializing with peers coefficients are less clear and offer minimal support for our predictions.     

Reducing Government Involvement in a Market: Lessons from the Privatization of Sallie Mae

Government intervention shapes institutions and markets; even when government seeks to reduce its involvement, it must protect against resulting market distortions. Government provided substantial benefits to Sallie Mae as a government‐sponsored enterprise (GSE). Giving up GSE status allowed Sallie Mae to expand the scope of its financial services beyond restrictions of its GSE charter. Benefits of GSE status led to scale economies and low cost structure that now propel the company's dominance and growth as a non‐GSE. Lessons from Sallie Mae apply to removal of GSE status from other GSEs and to restructuring and deregulation in other economic sectors.     

CRIME BY COMMITTEE: CONSPIRATORS AND COMPANY MEN IN THE ILLEGAL ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY CARTEL, 1954–19591

We show how cartels rely on the adaptive social structure of committee meetings to ameliorate the competitive difficulties of markets. We distill the structure of the cartel committee and test hypotheses relating market structure to committee structure and ultimately to the efficacy of cartel price‐fixing. Cartel continuity and the corporate authority of the cartel are strong predictors of cartel effectiveness. Cartel continuity is responsive to market conditions that favor cartel formation. Centralization of cartel authority in decision making results in improved collusive pricing effectiveness. Centralization of cartel authority responds to expanding industry volume that bring about incentives to increase firm level market share at the expense of other cartel members.