Agenda Power,Executive Decree Authority,and the Mixed Results of Reform in the Brazilian Congress

This article examines how institutional change in the use of extraordinary legislation affects delegation of power and unilateral action in new democracies. From 1988 to 2001, Brazilian presidents were able to reissue decrees indefinitely and thus had substantial legislative power. In 2001, Congress amended the constitution so as to restrict the president to a single reissue of each lapsed decree. This reform has had mixed results: although it ended the practice of infinite reissues, it induced Presidents Cardoso and Lula to use more decrees than previous executives had. Presidential agenda power, rather than being reduced, has been sharpened. By analyzing patterns of presidential initiatives from 1995 to 2005, we demonstrate the mixed results of this constitutional reform.     

JUVENILE COURT DISPOSITIONS:

The research question precipitated by the concern for “just sanctions” and effective treatment for future juvenile programs is: What have been the criterion used by juvenile court decision makers in disposition sentencing. Disposition is analyzed for both nonstatus and status offense groups. The method of analysis is a stepwise discriminant function. The findings indicate the importance of legalistic variables and a social class bias in the dispositions of both offense groups. The social class bias is much stronger in the case of status offenders and increases at subsequent court disposition levels. These data support the labeling-conflict contention of class bias in the application of sanctions and suggest a policy directive for future delinquency prevention programs.     

Do Intergovernmental Institutions Matter? The Case of Water Diversion Regulation in the Great Lakes Basin

This article explores the role of intergovernmental institutions in domestic policy formation by investigating the extent to which these institutions substantively influence domestic policy choices. It does so by utilizing a rational choice institutionalist approach that focuses on the constraints and incentives created by intergovernmental rules and how these constraints and incentives do or do not influence eventual government policy decisions. The veto player concept is used to highlight some of the most important constraints and incentives, as well as to differentiate among various types of intergovernmental institutions. The cases examined involve water diversion regulation in the Great Lakes Basin and the three distinct intergovernmental institutions that have been created in this area: the International Boundary Waters Treaty, the Great Lakes Charter, and the Water Resources Development Act. The evidence suggests that intergovernmental institutions can matter in the development of domestic policy, but only those that include veto players as part of their institutional design.     

Perceptions of policy choice in contemporary democracies

Though the concept of choice is essential to democracy, little is known about how citizens make sense of the diversity of policies offered by political elites. Research has found that institutional arrangements such as low electoral thresholds and multiple party competitors are associated with greater policy choice. Other work emphasises non‐institutional factors. No research, however, examines what the voters think. In this article these alternative explanations are assessed in terms of whether citizens believe parties to provide choice over policy. Evidence from 25 democracies reveals that electoral and party systems have no direct effect. Choice perceptions are instead affected by non‐policy factors: social heterogeneity and individual political dispositions. This result contrasts with analyses showing a strong connection between electoral rules and the diversity of messages communicated by parties during campaigns. The article also shows how choice perceptions matter for political behaviour. Overall, study findings imply that the promise of institutions for fostering representation is weaker than previously assumed.     

Optimism, Pessimism, and Coalitional Presidentialism: Debating the Institutional Design of Brazilian Democracy

Research on Brazil's political institutions has gone through several phases since democratisation in 1985. In the early years of democracy, pessimism prevailed with regard to governability. This view gave way in the mid-1990s to a more optimistic view that stressed two innovations of the Constitution of 1988: enhanced presidential power and centralised legislative procedure. In recent years, a third phase of research has shifted attention to the crucial role of inter-party alliances. These analytical approaches have converged into an emerging research programme on 'coalitional presidentialism', which places executive-legislative relations at the centre stage of macropolitical analysis. This article reviews the three phases of the debate and reflects on future research agendas.