THE CHANGING NATURE OF RURAL AMERICA1

Rural regions are changing, both in terms of economic dispersal and population patterns. Rural growth is attributed to technological innovation, improving capacity to deal with impending problems as well as improving quality of life, and intercommunity linkage. For some communities, this means the prospects of indigenous economic development.     

Politics,leadership, and experience in designing Ontario's cabinet

Abstract: Why are cabinet decision‐making systems designed the way they are? Traditional approaches to this question stress the importance of representational imperatives (i.e., region, language and gender), the need for managerial capacity and collegiality in complex organizations, or a particular government's fiscal or policy program. While these approaches have merit, they fail to pay sufficient attention to the fact that cabinet decision‐making systems are in the first instance very intimate reflections and extensions of the political instincts, personal aptitudes, and governing experience of first ministers. The author sets out to understand recent reforms to Ontario cabinet decision‐making in precisely this way ‐ how did Premier Michael Harris' sense of his government's mandate, his personal approach to decision‐making, and the practical lessons learned over the course of his government's first mandate influence the design of Ontario's cabinet decision‐making system between 1995 and 1999? This article begins with a short history of Ontario's cabinet decision‐making system, focusing on the period from 1968 to 1995. It then provides details of reforms introduced between 1995 and 1999 and concludes with some thoughts on how Premier Harris' political instincts, personal aptitudes, and governing experience influenced these reforms. Sommaire: Pourquoi les systèmes de prise de décisions du Cabinet sont‐ils conçus comme ils le sont? Les réponses traditionnelles à cette question soulignent l'impor‐tance des impératifs de représentation (c.‐à‐d. la région, la langue et le sexe), le besoin de compétence en matière de gestion et la collégialité dans les organismes complexes, ou bien un programme politique ou budgétaire particulier du gouvernement. Ces approches sont valables, mais elles ne tiennent pas suffisamment compte du fait que les systemes de prise de décisions du Cabinet sont, avant tout, le fruit de reflexions très approfondies et d'instincts politiques, d'aptitudes personnelles, et de l'expérience gouvernementale des premiers ministres. L'auteur de cet article essaie de comprendre, précisément dans ce sens, les récentes réformes en matière de prise de décisions au Cabinet de 1'Ontario: comment est‐ce que l'idée qu'a Michael Harris du mandat de son gouvernement, son approche personnelle face à la prise de décisions, et les leçons pratiques tirées de son premier mandat (1995–1999) ont‐elles influencé la conception du système de prise de décisions du Cabinet de l'Ontario? L'auteur commence par brosser un bref historique du système de prise de décisions du Cabinet de l'Ontario, en se penchant tout particulièrement sur la période allant de 1968 A 1995. Ensuite, il présente en détail les réformes introduites de 1995 à 1999 et conclut par quelques réflexions sur la manière dont les instincts politiques du Premier ministre Harris, ses aptitudes personnelles et son expérience du gouvernement ont influencé ces réformes.     

Discussion of 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes'

In a response to Yan Xuetong's paper, 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes', Ted Osius (writing in August 1999) discusses Dr Yan's perspective on Chinese history and the question of whether China's rise will be peaceful. Mr Osius argues that, while we cannot know for certain what China's future holds, the Clinton‐Gore Administration has been clear in its goal of integrating China into the leadership ranks of the world community.     

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND INTERSECTORAL TENSIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL OLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THE CASE OF HAZARDOUS WASTE

Superfund—the federal government's program to clean up toxic waste sites—was designed to promote cooperative interaction between levels of government and w ith the private sector. Implementation of the program has, produced a web of tensions instead. The tensions have been intergovernmental and intersectoral. As this examination of the cleanup of four South Carolina sites reveals, these tensions have served to delay and distort the implementation process.