Retention of Offender DNA Samples Necessary to Ensure and Monitor Quality of Forensic DNA Efforts: Appropriate Safeguards Exist to Protect the DNA Samples from Misuse

Retention of offender DNA samples serves an important quality assurance role for forensic DNA laboratories. Consistent with the principles of confidentiality underlying the establishment of the state and national DNA databases, safeguards are in place to protect the DNA samples from unauthorized use.     

Security threats and institutional response. The European context

This paper will explore the perceptions of security threats (identification of types and likelihood of occurrence) and institutional response (degree of institutional suitability according to type of threat) that prevails in the European context. It will compare how the main security institutions (NATO, EU and OSCE) respond to different type of security threats. This will be done through the aid of a number of security governance functions (conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, peace-keeping and peace-building). A main objective of the paper will be to examine which of the three is deemed most relevant in dealing with specific types of threats.     

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

Bureaucratic capacity and state-society relations in China

In view of the efforts of post-Mao state-rebuilding, how does bureaucratic capacity affect the pattern of state-society interaction in China, where a robust civil society is still missing? Using the case of China’s population control, we analyze the linkage between bureaucratic capacity and state-society relations. The study demonstrates remarkable resilience of the party-state and its transformative thrust in reformist China. Through a mix of mass mobilization and institutional building, the Chinese state remains puissant in extending social control over its people. Equally important, bureaucratic capacity is a major predictor of state coerciveness. Other things being equal, localities with stronger bureaucratic capacity tend to develop a less antagonist and more cooperative state-society relationship. Bureaucratic capacity can serve as remedy to despotic or authoritarian rule despite the lack of an autonomous civil society. This finding has important implications for the potential of democratization in China.     

Error minimization and deterrence in agency control

In the presented oversight model, in which a regulatory agency may collude with regulatees, a watchdog organization may scrutinize the agency’s decision-making and find evidence speaking for collusive behavior. Found evidence is of a specific, stochastic quality. Courts will overturn the administrative decision when the evidence presented in court exceeds a minimum quality standard set by the political principal. Lowering the quality standard increases the odds of finding evidence of sufficient quality and, hence, leads to increasing collusion deterrence and to a lower probability of acquitting collusive administrators (type I error), but also to a higher probability of convicting an innocent administrator (type II error). It is shown that, when welfare-maximization gives rise to an interior solution, the welfare-maximizing standard of evidence is lower than the one that merely minimizes the costs of legal errors without taking deterrence costs into account, but will imply incomplete deterrence. However, conditions can and will be identified under which both error cost minimization and complete deterrence coincide with welfare-maximization.     

高效薄层色谱法检测尿中硝西泮的代谢物7-氨基硝西泮

目的 建立用高效薄层色谱法定性及半定量测定人尿中硝西泮的代谢物7-氨基硝西泮(7ANIZ)含量的方法。方法 人口服治疗量10 mg硝西泮后,在pH 9条件下用乙醚进行提取,分析物斑点用氟罗里丝进行荧光显色,紫外灯下(366nm)观察荧光斑点;根据斑点荧光显色情况及强度进行7ANIZ定性及半定量检测。结果 尿中硝西泮代谢物7ANIZ检出限为5 ng/ml,测量限为15 ng/ml。结论 人口服治疗量10 mg硝西泮,用高效薄层色谱法可定性及半定量测定48 h内排泄尿中的7ANIZ。