Black and white perceptions of party differences

Despite a comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis whites in resources like education that often are considered to lead to political sophistication, African Americans show signs of being a rather politically sophisticated group of people. Given that better educated people are much more likely than those with less education to see larger differences between Democrats and Republicans, the propensity for blacks to perceive larger differences between the parties, both in general and on specific issues, is striking. This puzzle is explained by the fact that education has a huge impact on seeing partisan differences for whites, but not for blacks. That this understanding of the structure of American politics has so completely penetrated black public opinion is quite remarkable. Strength of partisanship, and to a lesser degree, racial consciousness, appear to be largely responsible for blacks (particularly less educated blacks) perceiving such stark party differences.     

Federalism As an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform

Federalism is first examined as an ideal-type political orderas possibly emergent from initial constitutional agreement amongmembers of a prospective political community. This abstractedand nonhistorical analysis is followed by an examination ofthe possible applicability of the federalist ideal as the basisfor reform in specific historical-institutional settings. Thedirection of constitutional change toward effective federalismis discussed, with the devolution of political authority fromcentralized structures carefully distinguished from the limitedconcentration of authority from previously autonomous politicalunits.     

Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism

Numerous laboratory experiments have investigated the performance of several processes for providing public goods through voluntary contributions. This research has been able to identify features of the institution or environment which are reliably likely to produce outcomes “close” to the free riding outcome or “substantially” greater than the pessimistic prediction of standard models. One such feature is the “marginal per-capita return” (MPCR) from the public good. Various authors have altered MPCR between groups or for an entire group at the same time. The experiments reported here address a different question, “What would happen if, within a group, some persons faced a ‘high’ MPCR while others faced a ‘low’ MPCR?”     

The Pending Revolution in Federal Accounting Standards

Accounting standards constitute the body of guidance needed to provide coherence and direction to accountants on how to keep the books. They inform the accountant about the logic of the way that accounting data should be organized and displayed in order to maximize its value to the prospective user. (The prospective users, in the case of federal accounting, range from the president and Congress through agency managers to the general public.) Federal accounting standards are the equivalent, for accounting, of budget concepts for the federal budget. After a long genesis, federal accounting standards are in the midst of a revolution which, if it succeeds, will transform the way accounting reports on federal fiscal activities and how it relates to the federal budget. This article, written from the perspective of a budget concepts technician who has participated in this effort, reviews these developments and where they seem to be heading.     

A transaction-based approach to policy intervention

A transaction-based approach to policy intervention is presented. The approach overcomes a number of weaknesses in current approaches to policy intervention. The approach involves three main conceptual elements: transactions, transaction governance mechanisms, and governance principles. The transaction is taken to be the basic unit of analysis. Profiles of transactions vary along a number of transaction dimensions. Transaction governance mechanisms - such as, for example, government service, regulation, contracts, vouchers, markets, taxes, and self-service - are each suitable for governing transactions having particular profiles. A mechanism will fail when used to govern transactions not fitting the profile. Governance principles are criteria or expectations - for example, efficiency, justice and liberty - used to judge how well a mechanism fulfills or achieves important societal goals. Specific choices of governance mechanisms (from the set that are technically feasible) therefore should be made according to how well they satisfy these governance principles. Public high school education is used as an example to illustrate the approach. A number of conclusions are offered.This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society for Public Administration Portland, Oregon, April, 1988.     

The earnings test and the short-run work response to its elimination

Eliminating the earnings test will have different effects on the work effort of persons aged 65-69, depending on whether or not they are currently working or currently receiving Social Security benefits. This article reviews the development of the earnings test and examines the theoretical implications on work effort of removing the test for members of this age group. It looks at the Current Population Survey (CPS) data to determine how many persons aged 65-69 have characteristics that can be identified with groups that would theoretically increase, decrease, or not change their work effort should they no longer be subject to the earnings test. This analysis suggests that at least 80 percent, and perhaps more than 90 percent, of the 9.7 million persons aged 65-69 will not change their level of work effort if the earnings test is eliminated. Individuals who would modify their hours worked and earnings are fairly evenly split among those who would increase, decrease, or have an undetermined direction of change in their work effort.     

On democracy and debt

As we explained there is really little a priori reasoning for a clear prediction that authoritarian regimes will incur more foreign debt. In fact, some other empirical literature reveals that such regimes will face a higher supply price for such debt. Anderson presents a study of a single year using an admittedly crude measure of authoritarianism that finds that such regimes do issue more debt.This study provides a fuller examination of the empirical relationship between foreign debt and the nature of the polity's regime. Utilizing a continuous democracy variable and a continuous political liberty variable, it tests the relationship between debt and political variables. It finds little empirical support for the thesis that democracy or autocracy influence foreign debt levels. Generally the continuous variables are not significant if we use a linear in the logs specification. While a linear specification obtains results more consistent with the idea that level of democracy decreases debt, it also obtains results even less favorable to the idea that extreme forms of autocracy increase debt.     

Executive budget proposal,executive veto,legislative override,and uncertainty: A comparative analysis of the budgetary process

This study examines the roles of the executive budgetary proposal, the executive veto, the legislative override, and legislative uncertainty about the executive's preferences in determining the outcome of a budgetary process. A sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional agents — a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive — is presented. To focus attention on the executive proposal, the veto, the override provision, and uncertainty, simplifying assumptions are made: (1) the appropriations committee has monopoly agenda power, and (2) there is a closed amendment control rule. In order to characterize sequential equilibria of various combinations of veto rules and override provisions, we examine a particular arrangement of agents' preferences and a two item budget. The results demonstrate that the final budget depends critically on the executive proposal, the executive veto rule, the override provision, and the uncertainty. We achieve three striking results. First, the executive proposal may be effective in reducing the frequency of the exercised veto. Second, for a given override provision, a movement from the item veto to the item reduction veto leaves the executive worse off in some cases. Third, with the same change in institutions, the government budget may increase.