Eurosceptic Challenger Parties and Political Opposition in European Union Politics: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?

Despite extensive research on Eurosceptic challenger parties, our knowledge of their influence on political opposition has so far been sparse. In this article we make an in‐depth assessment of parliamentary EU opposition, based on 4,264 statements made by national parliamentarians in the European Affairs Committees (EACs) of Denmark and Sweden. Our analysis shows that the presence of Eurosceptic challenger parties in the national parliamentary arena impacts patterns and practices of EU opposition significantly. A greater presence of ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties in parliament is associated with more opposition in EU politics. These parties deliver a vast majority of the polity‐oriented opposition towards the EU and present more policy alternatives than mainstream parties. The findings presented have implications for our understanding of national parliamentary EU opposition as well as for the assessment of the impact of Eurosceptic challenger parties on the process of European integration.     

Democracy at Rest: Strategic Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment

The Prohibition (Eighteenth, 1919) and repeal (Twenty-First,1933) amendments, which represent the only case of a later amendmentdirectly reversing an earlier one, were ratified by the twodifferent methods allowed by Article V of the United StatesConstitution: the former by state legislatures, the latter bystate conventions. This essay examines the legislatures-or-conventionsdichotomy as a microcosm of William Riker's treatment of liberalismand populism, with specific attention paid to the state conventionsthat ratified repeal. Using previously uncollected county datafrom the special elections to choose the 1933 convention delegates,this study demonstrates that invocation of the convention methodwas strategic, and intended not only to legitimate the Twenty-FirstAmendment but also to improve its chances of passage.     

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification foreminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood.This article models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework,where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land fora large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminentdomain, holdouts are a significant threat, resulting in costlydelay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminentdomain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain,thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiateprices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessivetransfer of land to the developer.     

Economic crises, capital transfer restrictions and investor protection under modern investment treaties

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points

• Capital liberalization was the norm of internationaleconomic relations until the Economic Depression of the 1930swhen exchange restrictions became an important instrument ofeconomic policy of many countries.
• The IMF Articles of Agreementwere the outcome of efforts by several countries to providean acceptable international legal framework that would minimizethe negative impact of exchange restrictions while at the sametime preserving the right of Member States to impose exchangerestrictions when faced with balance-of-payment problems.
• Thatposition is to a large extent maintained by most modern investmenttreaties although subject to heightened scrutiny by internationalarbitral tribunals under the disciplines of expropriation, nationaltreatment and fair and equitable treatment standards among othersin order to protect investors’ interests whilst safeguardinghost states, regulatory autonomy.