Analyzing linked systems of negotiations

This article presents a conceptual framework for analyzing the structure and dynamics of what the authors call linked systems of negotiations. Even such seemingly straightforward transactions as the purchase of a family car tend to involve linked negotiations. The framework highlights the importance of internegotiation processes in shaping Zones of Possible Agreement, and proposes a typology of linkage. By mapping out and reengineering linked systems, negotiators can enhance their ability to shape the structure within which their negotiations take place.     

全球反腐败法律成果及法律问题扫描

随着经济全球化 ,腐败对一国的投资环境、金融政策、贸易等不良影响更加明显。在以透明国际为首的国际反腐败力量推动下 ,国际反腐败在各个方面取得突破。但由于腐败根植于各国不同的政治、经济、文化环境中 ,法律的统一治理还存在许多亟待解决的问题。我国应加强与国际反腐败力量的立法、司法合作 ,维护我国反腐败的国际形象。     

适应军事变革要求推进军队政治工作的创新发展

新军事变革的发展给我军政治工作带来的挑战,要求我军政治工作从转变观念入手,与时俱进,改革创新,使我军政治工作不断适应新形势的需要,为赢得未来战争的胜利提供服务保证.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Sheldon S. Wolin:</Emphasis> Tocqueville between two worlds: The making of a political and theoretical life

Ohne Zusammenfassung

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Sheldon S. Wolin: Tocqueville between two worlds: The making of a political and theoretical life Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press 2001, 650 S., $ 24,95

     

Selbstentfesselung in kleinen Schritten? Deutschlands Außenpolitik zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts

Ohne Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag wurde bereits Anfang Januar 2003 abgeschlossen und konnte bis Mitte Februar nur noch geringfügig erg?nzt werden. Der Verfasser ist Herrn Fariborz Zelli, M.A., für seine Mithilfe bei der Vorbereitung dieses Essays zu gro?em Dank verpflichtet.     

A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy

Do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty? Previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous, thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action problems or competition. I develop a game‐theoretic model of bureaucratic policy making in which a political principal chooses the number of agents to handle a given task. Importantly, agents have policy preferences that may be opposed to the principal's, and furthermore may choose their policy or effort levels. Among the results are that redundancy can help a principal achieve her policy goals when her preferences are not aligned with the agents'. But redundancy is less helpful if even a single agent has preferences relatively close to the principal's. In this environment collective action problems may cause multiple agents to be less effective than a single agent. Redundancy can also be unnecessary to the principal if the agent's jurisdiction can be terminated.