An Economic Analysis of Flexible Permit Trading in the Kyoto Protocol

This paper evaluates the relative gains from augmenting or restricting several of the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. A nonlinear programming model of international emissions trading is used to assess the net benefits of extending trading across time periods and across countries (Joint Implementation), and including the developing world (Clean Development Mechanism). The effect of limiting permit purchases (supplementarity) is also evaluated. The analysis is intended to help guide further climate negotiations by identifying flexibility mechanisms that contribute the most to enhancing the gains from greenhouse gas mitigation and identifying restrictions that detract the most from these gains.     

Practical Imagination: A Possible Future for Federal Budgeting

To develop a federal budget process that delivers better fiscal outcomes for the nation consistently over an extended period would require new information and analysis, applying these to decisions through properly designed procedures, and strengthening the institutions that support wise fiscal choices. Changes in each of these process components intended to contribute to good fiscal outcomes are described, and obstacles to their adoption and use are noted. Such reforms could yield budgets that deploy public resources today to carry out strategies promising to increase the nation's ability to survive inevitable social and fiscal shocks and to take advantage of expected and unexpected opportunities for its citizens to thrive, grow, and fulfill their dreams.     

Do donors cooperatively fund foreign aid?

Donor’s demand equations for alternative forms of aid are derived for three allocation processes: noncooperative Nash-Cournot, cooperative Lindahl, and bureaucratic. Based on OECD data for official development assistance for 1970–2001, we apply non-nested tests to distinguish between Nash-Cournot and Lindahl reduced-form equations for 15 major donor nations. Noncooperative Nash-Cournot behavior characterizes many donors, with a few abiding by bureaucratic behavior and none by Lindahl behavior. Joint products are present for multilateral and bilateral giving. Despite the common-pool nature of giving to multilateral organizations, countries derive donor-specific benefits and often view others’ donations as complementary to their own gifts.