Policy research and analysis: an empirical profile, 1975–1980

A content analysis was conducted on 181 randomly sampled articles published in nine leading social policy journals from 1975 through 1980. The purpose of the study was to obtain a methodological and substantive profile of the state of the art of the policy sciences. Results indicate the existence of two prevailing types of policy analysis: quantitative-empirical and rhetorical-discussive.The positions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Science Foundation, the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, or Applied Science Associates, Inc.     

The Enactment of Bayh–Dole

The Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 reversed 35 years of public policy and gave universities and small businesses the unfettered right to own inventions that resulted from federally funded research. The Act was opposed by the Carter administration, which had a different view of how to utilize the results of federally funded research to drive economic development. It is not widely appreciated that the bill had died in the regular sessions of the 96th Congress and was only passed into law in a lame duck session necessitated to pass the budget. Only a magnanimous gesture of respect for Senator Birch Bayh, who had been defeated in the 1980 election, on the part of Senator Russell Long allowed the bill to receive the unanimous consent needed to pass a bill in lame duck session. This article lays out the roles of the key congressional staffers who forged this historic compromise and the last minute maneuvers needed to obtain President Carters signature.     

Crashing the Party: An Experimental Investigation of Strategic Voting in Primary Elections

The effect of primary formats on voting behavior and candidatefortune has been the topic of recent political, academic andlegal arguments. We address these debates by examining voterbehavior and election outcomes across primary systems in thelaboratory. While we find the rate of strategic voting isgenerally low, the rate varies across primary formats and thepotential impact on election outcomes differs fromconventional perceptions. Results suggest that more openprimary systems generate more strategic voting, but contraryto conventional wisdom, more open systems do not necessarilylead to more moderate election winners.     

The Etiology of the Occurrence of En Banc Review in the U.S. Court of Appeals

The U.S. Courts of Appeals, working principally through three-judge panels, constitute important final arbiters of the meaning of the federal constitution, laws, and regulations and, hence, significant policymakers within the federal system. En banc rehearing—reconsideration of the decision of a three-judge panel by the full complement of judges appointed to the circuit—is an institutional device that ensures circuit decisions are in line with the established preferences of the circuit. The use of en banc varies in frequency across circuits and within circuits over time. Drawing on legal, attitudinal, and strategic perspectives of judicial behavior, we develop and test a set of integrated expectations regarding the causes of this variation. Our analysis finds support for the operation of all three models and suggests that the influence of ideology on the use of en banc in the recent era is not unique but part of a long-standing pattern .     

Strategic institutional choice: Voters, states, and congressional term limits

States’ choices on term limits are quantified as a multiple-categorical variable capturing variation in the type of limits passed. Measures of relative political influence in Congress explain much of this variation. Using 1992 data on the American states, the model controls for unobserved heterogeneity due to voter access to direct democracy in some states. At 2002 values for congressional tenure and federal spending, the model predicts approximately eight to ten additional states would choose to limit their own members’ terms but cannot under a Supreme Court ruling. We discuss implications for institutional federalism and the potential passage of similar political institutions across the states.     

Corporate autonomy and institutional control: The crown corporation as a problem in organization design

Abstract: A central issue in the government-crown corporation decision-making relationship is the balance between corporate autonomy and institutional control. This study investigates the effects of organization designs on the balancing of autonomy and control in practice, taking account of the incentives and strategic behaviour of the relevant actors. Politicians, for example, seek to maximize their own political support, crown corporation executives their own autonomy, and bureaucratic officials within central agencies their own policy influence. Three positive approximations of normative models of organization design models are investigated in Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan. Each design establishes different “rules of the game” and offers different advantages. Alberta practice most closely approximates a “self-contained” design in which corporate actors have the information advantage and are most closely able to achieve their own objective. In Manitoba, where practice most closely approximated a “vertical information systems” design, central bureaucratic monitoring agents had the information advantage and were most closely able to achieve their own objective. Saskatchewan practice most closely approximates a “lateral relations” design. Neither corporate nor bureaucratic actors have an enduring information advantage or are more able than the other to achieve their own objective. The relative “efficiency” of these crown corporation organization designs is not known. But they do yield qualitatively different balancing outcomes. Determinations can be made, quite simply, in terms of who is “winning” the crown corporation “game.” Sommaire: L'un des aspects fondamentaux à considérer dans les rapports décisionnels entre les sociétés de la Couronne et le gouvernement est l'équilibre qui existe entre l'autonomie des sociétés et le contrble institutionnel. Plutôt que de spéculer sur le caractère optimal des divers modes organisationnels qui peuvent théoriquement servir à structurer de tels rapports, cette étude considkre leurs effets sur l'equilibre autonomie-contrble, d'un point de vue pratique, en tenant compte des comportements stratégiques et des incitations des différents intervenants. Ainsi, les politiciens cherchent à maximiser l'appui politique dont ils jouissent; les dirigeants des sociétés de la Couronne, eux, cherchent à défendre leur autonomie; de leur côte, les fonctionnaires des organismes cen-traux souhaitent protéger leur influence sur les politiques. Les auteurs se penchent sur trois modèles normatifs de concepts organisationnels en Alberta, au Manitoba et en Saskatchewan. Chaque modèle établit des «règles du jew» différentes et offre des avantages particuliers, en termes de ressources stratégiques d'in-formation pour les trois groupes d'intervenants. La répartition des avantages en matière d'information régit les comportements d'optimisation des intervenants, les amenant à différents résultats en termes d'équilibre entre I'autonomie des sociétés et le contrôle institutionnel. La pratique en Alberta s'apparente plus à un modêle d'autonomie où les intervenants des sociétés de la Couronne ont I'avantage sur le plan de l'information, ce qui leur permet de mieux parvenir à leurs propres objectifs. L'autonomie des sociétés I'emporte alors sur le contrôle des institutions. Au Manitoba, où la pratique se rapproche d'un modèle d'information médicale, les agents de surveillance des organismes centraux ont I'avantage et sont donc en mesure de mieux parvenir à leurs propres objectifs. Le contrôle des institutions I'emporte alors sur l'autonomie des sociétés de la Couronne. En Saskatchewan, le modèle s'approche de celui des «relations latérdes». Ni les intervenants des sociétés, ni les bureaucrates n'ont un avantage durable sur le plan de I'information de sorte que ni les uns ni les autres ne sont donc en mesure de mieux atteindre leurs propres objectifs. I1 en résulte éventuellement un équilibre entre l'autonomie des sociétés de la Couronne et le contrôle des institutions. L'on ignore I'eficacité relative de ces différents modèles organisationnels, mais I'on sait qu'ils ont pour résultat un équilibre différent. L'on peut donc, fort simplement, déterminer qui «gagne» au «jeu» des sociétés de la Couronne.     

Effects of Cyanoacrylate Fuming,Time After Recovery,and Location of Biological Material on the Recovery and Analysis of DNA from Post‐Blast Pipe Bomb Fragments*

Abstract: This study investigated the effects of time, cyanoacrylate fuming, and location of the biological material on DNA analysis of post‐blast pipe bomb fragments. Multiple aliquots of a cell suspension (prepared by soaking buccal swabs in water) were deposited on components of the devices prior to assembly. The pipe bombs were then deflagrated and the fragments recovered. Fragments from half of the devices were cyanoacrylate fumed. The cell spots on the fragments were swabbed and polymerase chain reaction/short tandem repeat analysis was performed 1 week and 3 months after deflagration. A significant decrease in the amount of DNA recovered was observed between samples collected and analyzed within 1 week compared with the samples collected and analyzed 3 months after deflagration. Cyanoacrylate fuming did not have a measurable effect on the success of the DNA analysis at either time point. Greater quantities of DNA were recovered from the pipe nipples than the end caps. Undeflagrated controls showed that the majority (>95%) of the DNA deposited on the devices was not recovered at a week or 3 months.