Human rights and forensic psychology

Objectives. Human rights serve to orientate practitioners to the necessary conditions for a minimally worthwhile life for service users, the prerequisites for a life of dignity and a chance at happiness, and the opportunity to incorporate into their life plans cherished values and goals. In this introduction to the special section paper, I discuss the basic concept of human rights and outline their relevance for clinical practice with offenders. Method. I explore the core values associated with human rights and suggest that one of their primary functions is to protect the internal and external conditions of individuals' agency and their pursuit of better lives. Conclusion. I briefly outline the three articles comprising this special section of LCP on human rights that address issues of risk, therapeutic jurisprudence, and the rights of detained persons.     

Search orders and computers

Legal and practical context: On the execution of a Search Order, the Supervising Solicitorensures that fair play is observed by the claimant's searchparty in circumstances which are always stressful and oftenemotional. With the rise of computer imaging orders, the lengthof time taken at the defendant's premises has increased andit frequently falls to the supervising solicitor to undertakeany post-execution search and review of the computer evidence.It all adds to the expense. This article offers suggestionsto ensure that the parties' positions are safe-guarded but theimpact of computer evidence is properly managed. Key points: The article sets out the history of the role of the supervisingsolicitor in the execution of a Search Order and how that rolehas evolved. The article then looks at the increased importanceof securing evidence held on computers during the Search Orderand the resultant impact. Suggestions are made as to the futuredrafting and conduct of Search Orders to ensure that the evidenceand the interests of the parties are safe-guarded but with aneye to controlling costs. The claimant's solicitors do not havethe luxury of time to debate these issues when preparing forits application. It is hoped this article provides the key points. Conclusions: The article brings to light many issues which ought to be consideredprior to the making of a Search Order. The suggestions offeredrely on the court taking a pro-active role and the claimantconducting proper due diligence.     

A Discussion Summary of the First Dispute Systems Design Conference

Conclusion A dominant theme throughout the conference was how best to relate existing, traditional dispute systems (e. g., the courts, grievance panels, etc.) to the methods generally advocated by dispute systems designers (e. g., negotiation, mediation, etc.). Exploring that relationship is one of many dispute system design issues worthy of further discussion by practitioners and scholars.In sum, the conference discussion strongly indicates that there is a common set of dispute systems design issues across several contexts. Practitioners were clearly able to build on each other's insights and to learn from one another's practices, even when the settings for these practices diverged widely. An approach that focuses on these common dispute systems design issues appears to be a powerful method of developing individual practitioners and of developing the practical knowledge base of the profession as a whole. Based on this observation, the answer to the question in the title of this article is yes. Tony Simons is a doctoral student at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management of Northwestern University, 3-191 Leverone Hall, Evanston, Ill. 60208.     

Political Equilibrium and the Provision of Public Goods

This paper treats interest groups – peoplein their role as consumers of a public goodand people in their role as taxpayers – asthe unit of account for representativevoting. Each group is allowed to make aneffort to support its preferred candidateand, at the margin, the effort-benefitratio is the political price the group iswilling to pay to secure an additionaldollar of benefits.

Under reasonable assumptions, a uniqueequilibrium is assured and itscharacteristics are quite intuitive. Inparticular, the marginal political benefit(from consumers) of the last unit of outputmust equal the marginal political cost(from taxpayers). Alternatively, the rateat which the politician can transformtaxpayer income into consumer surplus mustequal the ratio of their political prices. The result will be optimal only on the rareoccasion when the effort-benefit ratios ofthe two groups are equal.

Since political goals are themselves ``public goods'' for thetwo interest groups,they face all the normal free riderproblems. Moreover, even small differencesin the effort-benefit ratios of the twogroups lead to large welfare losses.

How bad can things get? Each group has anincentive to try to overcome free-riderproblems and divert resources from privatesector activities to politics. And anyincrease in political effort is alwaysrewarded. However, (1) the marginal returnis always higher for the group with thesmaller effort-benefit ratio; (2) thedifferential return between the two groupsgrows the further we stray from optimality;and (3) both groups face diminishingreturns. These incentives may act asnatural checks on political outcomes –placing some limit on the amount of wasteand inefficiency democracy is likely toproduce.

The influence of a producer (of the publicgood) group that collects a rent increasesthe likelihood that public goods will beoverproduced. In fact, it is conceivableto have a good with no value to consumersproduced, solely because of the influenceof producers. Comparative static analysisreveal that the political system willrespond to changes in market conditions ina way similar to economic markets. Themagnitude of these shifts differs fromeconomic markets, however. For goods thatare being overproduced, the politicalmarketplace overresponds to changes indemand and underresponds to changes incosts. The converse is true for goods thatare being underproduced.

     

Issue definition: the neglected foundation of effective issue management

Many issue management models proceed from issue scanning and identification directly to determining an objective, with insufficient attention to the important element of formally defining the issue. Proper definition is a vital foundation for effective issue management, and comprises a sound understanding of the issue itself, choosing exactly the right words to best position the issue and securing agreement on the definition. It also requires a full appreciation of the techniques used by other parties to try to redefine the issue to their competing agenda, and this paper identifies and categorises three such techniques. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications