Alternativen bei der Einführung von „Bologna“: Die Umstellung auf das BA/MA-System in der deutschen und der niederländischen Politikwissenschaft

The implementation of the Bologna Declaration differs considerably between participating countries. This is most true for the introduction of a two-tiered study system. The different speed of developments within the Netherlands and Germany is taken as the point of departure for a summary of some experiences with the introduction of the BA/MA-system within Dutch Political Science, in order to stimulate a broad-based discussion in Germany. The focus of the article lies on the alternative design options available, on the one hand, and concrete experiences with the implementation of these options at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, on the other     

National Parliaments and the Eurozone Crisis: Taking Ownership in Difficult Times?

The eurozone crisis suggests a significant reinforcement of executive dominance in EU policy-making. Opaque emergency decisions taken at European summits as well as treaties established outside of the EU legal framework facilitate the side-lining of democratically elected chambers. This development entails the risk of a new wave of de-parliamentarisation in EU policy-making. An effective scrutiny of crisis management by national parliaments is, however, indispensable for taking national ownership of the reforms in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This paper investigates national parliaments’ involvement in the development of instruments to combat the crisis. Based on a quantitative dataset of crisis-related parliamentary activities in 2010–2012, the article observes a very uneven engagement in the scrutiny of crisis management. Institutional prerogatives in EU affairs as well as macro-economic factors can partly explain the observed variation. Surprisingly, however, crisis-related parliamentary activity is not a reaction to Eurosceptic attitudes either in parliament or among the public.     

The EU as an International Counter-terrorism Actor: Progress and Constraints

During the first decade after the 9/11 attacks, the European Union (EU) has developed into an international counter-terrorism actor in its own right, a role increasingly accepted by third countries. This is a result of many influences, including a more favourable legal basis after the Amsterdam Treaty reforms; enhanced institutional capabilities, such as the growing importance of the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator; the use of a broad range of instruments, such as intelligence sharing; and the application of geopolitical priorities, guided by meetings at the United Nations and the Council of Europe (among other fora). At the same time, the EU's counter-terrorism role has remained subsidiary, both legally and politically, to that of its member states. Furthermore, a lack of its own operational capabilities, its institutional complexity, and its problems of cross-policy coordination continue to act as powerful constraints on the EU's counter-terrorism responsibilities.     

The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes

Coup-proofing pertains to political leaders’ strategies that will prevent groups inside or outside the state apparatus from seizing power via a coup d’état. One particular form of these strategies divides a country’s military into rivaling organizations, thereby creating an artificial balance between and structural obstacles for the armed forces. Despite the general claim that this institutional coup-proofing is indeed effective, a recent empirical study does not obtain evidence for a negative impact on the risk of coup attempts or coup outcomes. The authors take this finding as a motivation for their re-evaluation of the effect of institutional coup-proofing on coup risk and outcomes. By developing an argument that rests on the concepts of collective action and polarization, it is contended that institutional coup-proofing and coups are characterized by a U-shaped relationship: Institutional coup-proofing is likely to lower the likelihood of coup onsets and successful outcomes, yet only until a tipping point of about two equally strong military organizations. After this turning point, the risk of coup onset as well as coup success may increase again. Using time-series cross-section data for 1975–1999, the authors find strong and robust support for their claims in terms of coup onset, but not coup outcomes.     

Who is rebuilding Aceh? Tensions between groups of staff in an NGO

This article takes its point of departure in an international non-governmental aid organisation (INGO) active in post-disaster and post-conflict Aceh. Using material collected through fieldwork conducted in the organisation, the article addresses the issue of how the intrinsic logic and workings of development reinforce the historically tense relationship between Acehnese and Indonesians.     

Seasonal Affective Disorder: Clerk Training and the Success of Supreme Court Certiorari Petitions

We investigate why the Supreme Court grants a smaller percentage of cases at the first conference of each term compared to other conferences. According to received wisdom, Supreme Court law clerks are overly cautious at the beginning of their tenure because they receive only a brief amount of training. Reputational concerns motivate clerks to provide fewer recommendations to grant review in cert. pool memos written over the summer months. Using a random sample of petitions from the Blackmun Archives, we code case characteristics, clerk recommendation, and the Court's decision on cert. Nearest neighbor matching suggests clerks are 36 percent less likely to recommend grants in their early cert. pool memos. Because of this temporal discrepancy, petitions arriving over the summer have a 16 percent worse chance of being granted by the Court. This seasonal variation in access to the Court's docket imposes a legally irrelevant burden on litigants who have little control over the timing of their appeal.