Ideology in Policy Debates: Congress and the S&Ls in the 1980s

Is a national value such as free enterprise relevant to congressional debates of important economic policy bills? This question was examined using debates of three reform bills that dealt with savings and loan industry problems in the 1980s. To employ free enterprise concepts in justifying policy stands challenged legislators because industry problems contrasted sharply in the early 1980s (overregulation) and later (excesses under deregulation). Research demonstrated, however, that free enterprise concepts dominated the earlier discussions and, intriguingly, were at the center of the 1989 debate about bailing out the industry and reforming it. The conclusion elaborates free enterprise's role and speculates about the influence of another national value on the S & L discussions. Enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery Enforcement Act of 1989¹ capped a decade of congressional struggle with the question of how to treat the problems of federal savings and loan institutions. Popularly known as “thrifts” or “S & Ls,” their status became a matter of increasing concern to Congress as the 1980s unfolded and public indignation over a prospective government bailout of unprecedented proportions mounted. This article focuses on an aspect of this struggle that has a larger significance, namely, the place of national values2 in the genesis of important economic policy statutes. Given the predilections of American society, the value that tends to loom largest in major economic policy debates is popularly know as “free enterprise” or “the market economy.” One may reasonably object that U.S. capitalism operates under a “mixed economy” whose features include enterprises owned or sponsored by the federal government as well as government subsidies and regulation of private businesses. The short answer to this objection is that the term free enterprise is used here in a mythic sense and “myths are an essential starting place for insights into how values shape policy…” (de Neufville and Barton, 1987). In essence, this article examines the following questions: (1) Did congressional debates on proposed statutes relate provisions of the 1980, 1982, and 1989 bills to free enterprise concepts? (2) If so, what adjustments were made in these concepts for the sharply contrasting circumstances encountered by S & Ls in the course of the decade? and (3) How was the peculiar relationship of government deposit insurance of S & L accounts to free enterprise treated in the bills? Two background sections introduce the discussion.     

Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies

Consider a group of people confronted with a dichotomous choice (for example, a yes or no decision). Assume that we can characterize each person by a probability, p _i, of making the ‘better’ of the two choices open to the group, such that we define ‘better’ in terms of some linear ordering of the alternatives. If individual choices are independent, and if the a priori likelihood that either of the two choices is correct is one half, we show that the group decision procedure that maximizes the likelihood that the group will make the better of the two choices open to it is a weighted voting rule that assigns weights, w _i, such that $$w_i \propto \log \frac{{p_i }} {{1 - p_i }}.$$ We then examine the implications for optimal group choice of interdependencies among individual choices.     

Defining regulatory agencies for analytical purposes

Abstract. Traditionally regulatory agencies have been viewed from a very narrow perspective, usually relating to control of natural monopolies. This discussion reports on an on-going research programme at the University of Windsor designed to provide information on regulatory agencies and the concept of regulation and the regulative process. This initial discussion outlines the operational definition of regulatory agencies, and then applies it to assorted statutory agencies throughout Canada. The discussion notes problems involved in compiling a list of manageable proportions, and then of devising analytical techniques. The paper concludes that legislators have been remiss in defining regulatory functions for administrative purposes and that they have tended to confuse regulatory, regulative, and adjudicatory functions to the detriment of all concerned. As well, the paper suggests a need for provincial governments to maintain accurate records of agencies and other delegated statutory powers and authorities. Sommaire. On considère traditionnellement les organismes de régulation dans une optique très étroite, généralement celle de la régulation des monopoles naturels. Cet exposé concerne le programme de recherche que poursuit l'université de Windsor, conçu pour fournir des renseignements sur les organismes de régulation et sur le concept de la régulation et de son processus. Le débat initial dégage la définition opérationnelle des organismes de régulation pour Fappliquer ensuite à une variété d'organismes de tout le Canada. L'auteur indique les problèmes que posent l'établissement d'une liste de dimensions raisonnables et la mise au point de techniques analytiques. Il conclut en declarant que les législateurs ont négligé de définir les fonctions de régulation à des fins administratives et qu'ils ont eu tendance à confondre les fonctions réglementaire, régulatrices et adjudicatrices au détriment de tous les intéressés. Il maintient aussi qu'il est nécessaire, pour les gouvernements provinciaux, de tenir des dossiers exacts des organismes auxquels ont été délégués des pouvoirs statutaires.     

Book reviews

Bill Jordan, The New Politics of Welfare (Sage, London, 1998), 260 pp., ISBN 0–7619–6022–8 (pb)

Michael Cox (ed.), Rethinking the Soviet Collapse. Sovietology, the Death of Communism and the New Russia (Pinter, London, 1998), 294 pp., ISBN 1–85567–321–5 (hb), 1–85567–322–3 (pb)

Adrian Little, Post‐industrial Socialism: Towards a New Politics of Welfare (Routledge, London, 1998), 190 pp., ISBN 0–415–17193–8 (hb), 0–415–17194–6 (pb)

Perry Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity (Verso, London and New York, 1998), 143 pp., ISBN 1–85984–222–4 (pb), 1–85984–864–8 (hb)

Adrian Guelke, South Africa in Transition. The Misunderstood Miracle (I. B. Tauris, London, 1999), 224 pp., ISBN 1–86064–343–4 (hb)

Ryan Bishop and Lillian S. Robinson, Night Markets: Sexual Cultures and the Thai Economic Miracle (Routledge, London and New York, 1998), 278 pp., ISBN 0–415–91429–9 (pb)

Frank Field, Stakeholder Welfare (Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1996), 114 pp., ISBN 0–255 36390–7 (pb)

David G. Green, Reinventing Civil Society; the Rediscovery of Welfare without Politics (Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1993), 166 pp., ISBN 0–255 36279‐X (pb)

David G. Green, Benefit Dependency; how Welfare Undermines Independence (Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1998), 49 pp., ISBN 0–255 36433–4 (pb)

Will Hutton, Stakeholding and its Critics (Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1997), 102 pp., ISBN 0–255 36396–6 (pb)

Lawrence M. Mead, From Welfare to Work; Lessons from America (Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1997), 155 pp., ISBN 0–255 36399–0 (pb)     

Membership in Canadian regulatory agencies

Abstract. The paper reports some of the results obtained from a questionnaire administered to 320 members of 70 federal and provincial regulatory agencies in Canada. The data contained in this paper encompasses three areas: fundamental socio-economic information about regulators; their perceptions of why they were selected for positions with the agency; and their ideological and political predilictions. The paper concludes, subject to the qualifications set forth in the paper, that Canadian regulators are of a fairly high quality but that they are not as judicial as they assume or as free from politics as might be presumed. Sommaire. L'auteur de cet exposé donne les résultats d'un questionnaire auquel ont répondu 320 membres de 70 organismes de regulation fédéraux et provinciaux au Canada. Les résultats de ce questionnaire se regroupent sous trois rubriques: données socio-économiques fondamentales sur les responsables de la réglementation; les opinions des régisseurs quant aux raisons pour lesquelles ce poste leur été confié; et leurs orientations idéologiques et politiques. L'auteur conclut que sous certaines réerves, les régisseurs au Canada sont d'un assez haut calibre, mais qu'ils ne sont ni aussi impartiaux qu'ils le croient, ni aussi indépendants de la politique qu'on pourrait le supposer.