THE CUSTOMER IS SOMETIMES RIGHT: THE ROLE OF CUSTOMER VIEWS IN MERGER INVESTIGATIONS

Antitrust enforcement officials and practitioners generallyagree that customers should have a prominent role in the mergerreview process. The question of the appropriate level of reliancethat competition authorities and courts should give to customertestimony has been the subject of considerable debate sincethe Arch Coal and Oracle decisions. This paper contains a comprehensivediscussion of the use of customer testimony throughout the U.S.merger review process, from the initial merger notificationfiling to injunction proceedings in federal court. We discussthe benefits from and problems with the use of customer testimony,including how these problems have led to litigation losses forthe U.S. antitrust authorities. What is the appropriate roleof customer testimony and when is it most probative? We contendthat customers can provide investigators and judges with informationregarding several relevant issues in an acquisition, includingindustry structure, geographic and product demand substitution,and acceptance of potential market entrants. In contrast, customerswill have considerably less information relevant to the likelihoodof entry, the extent of any merger-specific efficiencies, andthe validity of a failing firm defense. They will almost neverbe qualified to offer legal conclusions, such as the propermarket definition or likely competitive effects of a proposedmerger. We conclude that courts have generally remained consistentin their reliance on customer testimony, including in the ArchCoal and Oracle cases, and that customer testimony, despiteits limitations, should and will continue to be important ateach stage of the merger review process.     

Police interviews with suspected child sex offenders: does use of empathy and question type influence the amount of investigation relevant information obtained?

The use of the criminal justice system to force offenders to receive psychological treatment is one of the most controversial aspects of service provision for offenders. Coerced treatment needs to be distinguished from pressured treatment, both having objective and subjective dimensions. In this paper some arguments for and against coerced offender rehabilitation are discussed. We suggest that coercing offenders into attending rehabilitation programmes (or placing legal pressure on them to attend) is unlikely by itself to lead to poorer outcomes. Rather, the individual's perception of coercion will be more influential in determining how an offender approaches treatment. Even when offenders perceive they are being coerced, it is likely that pre-treatment anti-therapeutic attitudes can change over the course of a programme, such that therapeutic gains (risk reduction) can occur. Coercion and its effects on treatment engagement and rehabilitation outcomes require further empirical research and conceptual analysis.     

WHISTLEBLOWING WITHOUT TEARS: THE EXPOSURE OF BRISBANE'S KING GEORGE SQUARE CAR PARK FRAUD

Abstract: This is essentially a “now it can be told” account of a massive fraud perpetrated on the Brisbane City Council in the mid-1970s by six attendants in a council car park, who manipulated bundy clocks to falsify departure times on parking tickets surrendered by departing motorists. Because of bitter personal rivalry between two senior council officials, which was complicated by (i) strong support for one official at elected member level, (ii) the subsequently discovered domestic liaison of the latter official with one of the prime suspects, and (iii) bungling in the crown prosecutor's office leading to a judge's decision to throw out the initial conspiracy charge against the car park attendants, it seemed that they might be reinstated and resume stealing on a massive scale. A method of dealing effectively with the issue, involving “blowing the whistle” while protecting the identity of the whistleblowers, was therefore devised. As a result, the thieves were eventually charged and convicted individually. The senior official who advised against police investigation of the suspected fraud while concealing his relationship with a prime suspect was also punished. The paper concludes with a defence of the deception perpetrated by whistleblowers to protect themselves from possible retribution.     

Tissue distribution of lidocaine after fatal accidental injection

The accidental death of a 64-year-old heart patient as a result of the injection of an incorrect dose of lidocaine is presented. The attending nurse inadvertently administered an intravenous bolus of 10 mL of 20% lidocaine (2g). The patient should have received 5 mL of 2% lidocaine (0.1 g). Such iatrogenic overdoses of lidocaine arise from confusion between prepackaged dosage forms. Lidocaine concentrations (mg/L or mg/kg were: blood, 30; brain, 135; heart, 106; kidney, 204; lung, 89; spleen, 115; skeletal muscle, 20; and adipose, 1.3. The results indicate that even during cardiopulmonary resuscitation as much as 38% of the administered dose of lidocaine may be found in poorly perfused tissue such as skeletal muscle and adipose.     

The economy,corruption, and the vote: Evidence from experiments in Sweden and Moldova

How does corruption affect voting behavior when economic conditions are poor? Using a novel experimental design and two original survey experiments, we offer four important conclusions. First, in a low corruption country (Sweden), voters react negatively to corruption regardless of the state of the economy. Second, in a high corruption country (Moldova), voters react negatively to corruption only when the state of the economy is also poor; when economic conditions are good, corruption is less important. Third, respondents in Sweden react more strongly to corruption stimuli than respondents in Moldova. Finally, in the low corruption country, sociotropic corruption voting (or voting based on corruption among political leaders) is relatively more important, whereas in our high corruption country, pocketbook corruption voting (or voting based on one's own personal experience with corruption, i.e., being asked to pay bribes) is equally prevalent. Our findings are consistent with multiple stable corruption equilibria, as well as with a world where voters are more responsive to corruption signals more common in their environment.     

People Power or a One‐Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a crucial question is whether popular protest is now likely to be a permanent part of Middle Eastern politics or if the protests that have taken place over the past two years are more likely to be a “one‐shot deal.” We consider this question from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the relationship between the consequences of protests in one period and the incentives to protest in the future. The model provides numerous predictions for why we might observe a phenomenon that we call the “one‐shot deal”: when protest occurs at one time but not in the future despite an intervening period of bad governance. The analysis focuses on the learning process of citizens. We suggest that citizens may not only be discovering the type or quality of their new government—as most previous models of adverse selection assume—but rather citizens may also be learning about the universe of potential governments in their country. In this way, bad performance by one government induces some pessimism about possible replacements. This modeling approach expands the formal literature on adverse selection in elections in two ways: it takes seriously the fact that removing governments can be costly, and it explores the relevance of allowing the citizen/principal to face uncertainty about the underlying distribution from which possible government/agent types are drawn.