Regulatory Disclosure of Offending Companies in the Dutch Financial Market: Consumer Protection or Enforcement Publicity?

Regulatory disclosure of names of offending companies is increasingly popular as an alternative to traditional command and control regulation. The goals and intended effects of disclosure are not always clear, however. Do regulators wish to increase their transparency, or do they intend to name and shame? This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the underlying working mechanism of regulatory disclosure of offenders' names through a case study of the Dutch Authority for Financial Markets' disclosure policy. It distinguishes two types of disclosure strategies: consumer oriented and firm oriented. The case study shows that although informing consumers was the primary purpose of disclosure as intended by the Dutch legislature, the purpose in practice has shifted to informing companies about the regulators' enforcement policy. The nature of the disclosed information makes it unlikely that disclosure adequately prevents financial risk taking by consumers. Instead of empowering consumers, disclosure has been incorporated in a traditional deterrence logic, turning out not to be an example of new governance but instead a modern version of command and control enforcement publicity.     

FRIENDS WITH MY FUTURE SELF: LONGITUDINAL VIVIDNESS INTERVENTION REDUCES DELINQUENCY

In a field experiment, we use a novel method to test whether instilling a greater sense of vividness of the future self motivates people to act in a more future‐oriented way and reduces their delinquent involvement. We manipulate vividness of the future self by having participants, a sample of high‐school youth (N = 133), “befriend” an avatar representing their future self on a social network website. For 7 days, they reply to short messages from their future self designed to trigger thinking about that distant self. Using repeated‐measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), we find that participants who had been linked to their future self report less delinquent involvement, whereas controls did not. Furthermore, the results of a nonparametric bootstrapping procedure show that this effect is mediated by changes in vividness of the future self, such that increases in vividness lead to lower self‐reported delinquency. We conclude that vividness of the future self holds promise not only as a cognitive explanation for the failure to make informed cost–benefit trade‐offs but also for interventions aiming to reduce delinquency.