Detention Short of Arrest For Questioning in England: An Update

This research sampled 163 nations of the world to determine the use and non-use of capital punishment for 1980–85. The first conclusion was that the majority of the nations do have a legal device to administer capital punishment (77% with Yes; N = 126). The 22 nations who executed averaged 4.2 executions, per year. When the other nations are factored in, the average is 1.57 “official executions” per year (N = 163). Many nations have the legal device to execute, but few do. The top nations reporting were South Africa with 111, and Mauritius with 25 (per year 1980–85).

The average age for execution for the 42 reporting nations was 18. The United States of America was the only nation reporting for less than 16 years old. The following “methods of execution” were reported:

1.

Hanging (N = 26, 57%)

2.

Shooting (N = 11, 24%)

3.

Beheading (N = 7, 15%)

Nations also excluded from the death penalty for the following reasons:

1.

Mental Illness

2.

Juveniles

3.

Pregnant Woman

Only 7 nations reported “open” or “public” executions.     

How to Counter Radical Narratives: Dutch Deradicalization Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals

This article deals with the role of government in encouraging the decline of radical movements. The question posed is: “Which story can the government tell to encourage the decline of radical groups and the disengagement of their members?” The article makes use of the survey of factors promoting decline and disengagement drawn up by Demant, Slootman, Buijs (? ^?Deceased. ) and Tillie in 2008, as well as the factor “official policy strategies” based on concepts taken from discourse analysis, adapted to counterterrorism and deradicalization strategies by De Graaf in 2009. The article will therefore not address the different practical measures in this field, but focus instead on the perception of these official measures by the radicals. It will illustrate this with two case studies: the deradicalization of South Moluccan youths in the 1970s and of jihadist radicals after 2001, both in the Netherlands.     

Mind the gap: How party–voter incongruence fuels the entry and support of new parties

This article examines to what extent ideological incongruence (i.e., mismatch between policy positions of voters and parties) increases the entry of new parties in national parliamentary elections and their individual-level electoral support. Current empirical research on party entry and new party support either neglects the role of party–voter incongruence, or it only examines its effect on the entry and support of specific new parties or party families. This article fills this lacuna. Based on spatial theory, we hypothesise that parties are more likely to enter when ideological incongruence between voters and parties is higher (Study 1) and that voters are more likely to vote for new parties if these stand closer to them than established parties (Study 2). Together our two studies span 17 countries between 1996 and 2016. Time-series analyses support both hypotheses. This has important implications for spatial models of elections and empirical research on party entry and new party support.     

Multiple roots of the populist radical right: Support for the Dutch PVV in cities and the countryside

Populist radical right parties are considerably more popular in some areas (neighbourhoods, municipalities, regions) than others. They thrive in some cities, in some smaller towns, and in some rural areas, but they are unsuccessful in other cities, small towns, and rural areas. We seek to explain this regional variation by modelling at the individual level how citizens respond to local conditions. We argue that patterns of populist radical right support can be explained by anxiety in the face of social change. However, how social change manifests itself is different in rural and urban areas, so that variations in populist radical right support are rooted in different kinds of conditions. To analyse the effects of these conditions we use unique geo-referenced survey data from the Netherlands collected among a nationwide sample of 8,000 Dutch respondents. Our analyses demonstrate that the presence of immigrants (and particularly increases therein) can explain why populist radical right parties are more popular in some urban areas than in others, but that it cannot explain variation across rural areas. In these areas, local marginalization is an important predictor of support for populist radical right parties. Hence, to understand the support for the populist radical right, the heterogeneity of its electorate should be recognized.     

THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF AMERICANS' PUNITIVENESS: A TEST OF THREE COMPETING MODELS*

The sustained movement to “get tough” on crime, especially through mass imprisonment, has prompted several prominent efforts to explain the public's harshness toward crime. From the extant literature, we demarcate the following three competing theories of public punitiveness: the escalating crime-distrust model, the moral decline model, and the racial animus model. Controlling for other known predictors of crime-related opinions, we test the explanatory power of these perspectives to account for support for the death penalty and for a punitive crime-control approach. Our analysis of a national sample of respondents surveyed in the 2000 National Election Study reveals partial support for each model. Racial animus, however, seems to exert the most consistent effect on public sentiments. This finding suggests that racial resentments are inextricably entwined in public punitiveness and thus should be incorporated into any complete theory of this phenomenon.     

STRATEGIES FOR SAFEGUARDING PUBLIC VALUES IN LIBERALIZED UTILITY SECTORS

In the utility sectors, public values such as affordability, safety, and protection of the environment, require safeguarding. In the last 15 years, most utilities have been either liberalized or privatized. In an attempt to protect public values under these new conditions, this shift has been accompanied by an emphasis on tight regulations and strict norms. These are examples of hierarchical safeguarding mechanisms. This mechanism can cause adverse effects, such as an increase in transaction costs, which diminish or even outweigh the supposed advantages of liberalization and privatization. In addition to hierarchical safeguarding, this article describes two mechanisms used to safeguard public values: network mechanisms and market mechanisms. We suggest that smart combinations of network and hierarchy on the one hand, and market and hierarchy on the other, will lead to more effective and efficient safeguarding of public values than relying on hierarchy alone.     

Does a public sphere exist in the European Union? An analysis of the content of the debate on the Haider case

Abstract.  This article sets out how the public sphere can be studied through an analysis of the content of a specific debate. A public discourse can be said to pertain to a European Union-wide public sphere where the discourse within the EU is significantly different from that developed in non-EU countries, where such differences are not nationally defined, and where the debates in individual newspapers (which provide the fora for a public sphere) should be connected on the basis of some underlying factors. These conditions are tested with a quantitative analysis of the newspaper debate in 1999 and 2000 on the sanctions of the EU-14 against Austria. To the extent that the conditions are found, it can be concluded that there exists a European public opinion. The objective of studying this specific case is to demonstrate that, as far as an EU issue is concerned, there are already signs of an EU transnational political community.     

CRACKS IN THE PENAL HARM MOVEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD*

Research Summary For more than three decades, the penal harm movement, which involves “get tough” ideology and policies, has held sway over U.S. corrections. Scholars have justifiably detailed and decried this movement, but in so doing, they have also inadvertently contributed to the view that a punitive worldview is hegemonic. In contrast, we detail four major “cracks” in the penal harm movement's dominance: the persistence of rehabilitative public attitudes, the emergence of second thoughts about the wisdom of harsh sanctions, the implementation of progressive programs, and the increasing legitimacy of the principles of effective intervention for guiding correctional practices. Policy Implications Taken together, these “cracks” comprise evidence that ideological space and political will exist to fight the penal harm movement and to map out a more efficacious and progressive response to crime. Because of the persistence of social welfare sentiments and growing challenges to the legitimacy of “get tough” policies, the potential to continue, if not expand, this countermovement is present. Taking advantage of this opportunity, however, will require forfeiting the belief that there is no escape from a punitive future and undertaking systematic efforts to devise correctional strategies that are based on solid science, improve offenders' lives, and protect public safety.     

The Olympics Economic Bonanza

SINCE Los Angeles unexpectedly reaped a profit in 1984 for the first time in the history of the modem Olympics, the quadrennial event has become an economic bonanza for host cities. Barce- lona, for example, achieved a profit of US $26.05 billion in 1992. The Olym- pic-related economy in Beijing is also picking up as the big event draws near.and put up eight temporary structures in and around the park. After the Games, the park and venues will continue to host top sporting events, and provide ample facilities for the public＇s sporting activities. The boom is expected to last well beyond August. At the begin- ning of 2007, the Beijing Municipal Government stated that sports-related businesses are set to be one of the city＇s