Obsession With English

Almost every day I am asked by someone in China to teach English. Professors ask me to come to their classes; friends ask me to tutor their children; deans ask me to join their foreign language departments.     

On Biehl's Defense of Bookchin's Immanent Dialectic

Stephen G. Bunker. Underdeveloping the Amazon: Extraction, Unequal Exchange, and the Failure of the Modern State. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1985.

Susanna Hecht and Alexander Cockburn: The Fate of the Forest: Developers, Destroyers and Defenders of the Amazon. Harper Perennial, New York, 1990.

Chico Mendes: Fight for the Forest: Chico Mendes in His Own Words. (Additional material by Tony Gross). Latin American Bureau, London, 1989; distributed in U.S. by Monthly Review Press.     

Local government in Europe: Retrenchment,restructuring and British exceptionalism

This article compares the strategy of British governments towards elected local government following the onset of fiscal stress in the mid‐1970s with those of two other western European countries with a unitary system of government: France and Sweden. The conclusion reached is that, notwithstanding different national configurations of central‐local government relations and the distinctiveness of the British strategy, there are similar policy and institutional outcomes in each case. In so far as such outcomes are taking place irrespective of the party political or ideological complexion of governments, they are consistent with a neo‐Fordist interpretation of local government restructuring.     

Political Institutions and Conservation Outcomes: Wildlife Policy in Zambia

“Messy” democratic political institutions might generate ineffective conservation policy watered down by competing interest groups and rival political parties. A hardcore environmentalist may believe that a pro‐conservation dictatorship would be the type government best able to meet her goals. Such an environmental fantasy became reality in Zambia under President (1972‐1991) Kenneth Kaunda. But despite his dictatorial powers, he did not have much success in curbing the poaching epidemic that swept through Zambia in the 1970s and 80s. The structure of the one‐party state, together with a fall in the price of Zambia's principal export (copper) and a concomitant increase in the value of many wildlife products, created an environment that generated incentives for politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens to disregard Kaunda. This analysis challenges conventional wisdom about the politics of one‐party states. It shows that even in the case of one‐party government, the structure of political institutions remains critical to the extent of a dictator's control.     

Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking

How do policies in international organizations reflect the preferences of powerful institutional stakeholders? Using an underutilized data set on the conditions associated with World Bank loans, we find that borrower countries that vote with the United States at the United Nations are required to enact fewer domestic policy reforms, and on fewer and softer issue areas. Though U.S. preferences permeate World Bank decision making, we do not find evidence that borrower countries trade favors in exchange for active U.S. intervention on their behalf. Instead, we propose that U.S. influence operates indirectly when World Bank staff—consciously or unconsciously—design programs that are compatible with U.S. preferences. Our study provides novel evidence of World Bank conditionality and shows that politicized policies can result even from autonomous bureaucracies.     

Regularities in Eyewitness Identification

What do eyewitness identification experiments typically show? We address this question through a meta-analysis of 94 comparisons between target-present and target-absent lineups. The analyses showed that: (a) correct identifications and correct-nonidentifications were uncorrelated, (b) suspect identifications were more diagnostic with respect to the suspect’s guilt or innocence than any other response, (c) nonidentifications were diagnostic of the suspect’s innocence, (d) the diagnosticity of foil identifications depended on lineup composition, and (e) don’t know responses were nondiagnostic with respect to guilt or innocence. Results of diagnosticity analyses for simultaneous and sequential lineups varied for full-sample versus direct-comparison analyses. Diagnosticity patterns also varied as a function of lineup composition. Theoretical, forensic, and legal implications are discussed.     

Politics and Corporate‐Sector Environmentally Significant Actions: The Effects of Political Partisanship on U.S. Utilities Energy Efficiency Policies

This study assesses the direct, indirect, and total impacts of political partisanship on state‐level utilities' investment in energy efficiency. This subject is of utmost importance because energy efficiency improvement has become a linchpin in worldwide efforts to combat climate change and other environmental challenges. Analysis of data on 51 electric utilities nested within 31 U.S. states indicates that political partisanship influences utilities' energy efficiency policies. There is strong evidence that electric utilities in states dominated by the Republican Party are less likely to invest in energy efficiency than those in states governed by the Democratic Party. This finding suggests that political partisanship may be shaping the policy and regulatory frameworks put in place by state governments to incentivize or compel the participation of private‐sector entities' in environmental management and/or resource conservation.