Government spending cycles: Ideological or opportunistic?

This paper examines whether partisan and opportunistic motives affect government expenditure growth in the Netherlands. The time series analysis, covering the period 1953–1993, allows for different types of government spending. In general, spending is inspired by ideological and opportunistic motives: all government expenditure categories show an upward drift during election times and the ‘partisan’ motives behind government spending are clearly revealed: left-wing cabinets attach greater importance to social security and health care than right-wing cabinets and right-wing cabinets value expenditure on infrastructure and defense more than left-wing parties.     

A political economic analysis of labor migration and income redistribution

We present a two-country political economic model of income redistribution with internationally mobile labor. Migration can be exogenous and/or endogenous (i.e., determined by labor income differentials). Political influence is determined by the size and homogeneity of the groups, where the latter can be affected by immigration. We show that immigration can increase the transfers to, and the income of, the mobile group. We also investigate the possibility of migration regulation, tax-transfer policy competition and coordination and, finally, coordination of regulation policies. It is shown that the selection of any of those regimes will depend on the particular distribution of political influence among the relevant social groups in the two countries.

     

The ruthless Fed: A critique of the AST hypothesis

This paper examines the hypothesis that the Great Contraction was the result of rational rent-seeking by members of the Federal Reserve System. In contrast to the AST hypothesis, evidence on the share prices of member banks that survived the contraction suggests that the owners of these banks suffered an absolute decline in real wealth and a decline relative to a broad spectrum of other investment alternatives. Furthermore, monetary surprises had no statistically discernible effect on the share prices of these banks. This evidence conflicts with the notion that rational rent-seeking would lead the owners of member banks and their bureaucratic conspirators in the Federal Reserve System to unleash a policy with the goal of contracting the money supply by 35 percent.     

Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior

Most analyses of preferences for government-supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society, these preferences are revealed by an individual choice: the vote. In this paper this is taken account of in a model, explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi-party system. The model assumes that voters may be categorized into K groups of individuals, pursuing the same interests, who remember how parties do in representing these interests (given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy). The model allows one to estimate party identification, sensitiveness to economic performances, time preference, and relative preferences for public versus private goods, all for each of the groups. Furthermore, the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies.An empirical application of the model to the Netherlands is presented, albeit that data restrictions did not allow a distinction of more than one group. The results in terms of significance of the coefficients as well as the interpretation of the original parameters are promising. The two main conclusions are that the relative preference for private versus collective consumption is lower than the existing ratio in the Netherlands, and that two parties forming a government coalition are not held equally responsible for the policies.     

Luther gulick,public administration and classical management

The late Luther Gulick (1892-1993), often known as the dean of U.S. public administration, left behind him an enormous and wide-ranging literary corpus, but no single systematic work. This essay presents both a personal and an intellectual portrait of Gulick. The personal portrait is accomplished primarily through Gulick's own words derived from relevant published works, autobiographical fragments, and a series of interviews with the author. The intellectual portrait concentrates on a single stream. of thought--classical organization theory and design--and outlines the evolution of Gulick's thought through time, with comments here and there.     

From Public Sociology to Public Philosophy: Lessons for Law and Society

The late Philip Selznick's final book, A Humanist Science, examines the role of values and ideals in the social sciences, including the study of law and society. Throughout his academic career, Selznick was committed to what he called “legal naturalism,” a sociological version of the natural-law perspective, while his critics continue to adhere to various forms of positivism. But the age-old opposition between natural law and legal positivism today may be giving way to the quest for public sociology—a sociology that promotes public reflection on significant social issues and thus functions as a moral and political force. A Humanist Science ends with a strong plea for public philosophy. Public philosophy overlaps with public sociology but is a much stronger concept. Selznick's message of public philosophy may be another of his enduring contributions to the field of law and society.     

The Importance of Subjective Data for Public Agency Performance Evaluation

Evaluating public agency performance has typically been based on objective measurements. However, some researchers contend that evaluation is not complete without considering client perceptions of agency performance. This study supports combining subjective client perceptions with objective data in the evaluation process. Survey results and internal performance data are examined for a state agency charged with investigating citizen disputes with utility companies. Regression analyses show that the factors that most influence the client’s satisfaction with agency performance are the client’s perception of how long it took to resolve the dispute, based on survey results, and whether the case was decided in the client’s favor, from the agency’s internal records. The “real” resolution time recorded in the agency’s information system was not significant. These results indicate that subjective data provide valuable information for evaluating agency performance.