Inside the Autonomous State: Programmatic Elites in the Reform of French Health Policy

This article combines the methods of institutionalist analysis and the sociology of elites to look inside the black box of the French state. We identify key groups of policymakers in the social policy sector and track both their policy preferences and the results of their efforts from the mid‐1980s through the late 1990s. Our conclusion is that budgetary and ideological challenges to existing policies led to the consolidation within the Ministry of Social Affairs of what we label a “programmatic elite,” whose influence derived less from the positions held by its members than from the coherence and applicability of its state‐centered policy model. The competition for legitimate authority between such programmatic elites, we conclude, is an important but often overlooked endogenous source of policy change in situations of institutional stability.     

Banking, interest intermediation and political power

Abstract. This article seeks to introduce the concept of political power more explicitly into the discussion of the organizational attributes of societal interests. In pursuit of this objective, it defines a set of empirical indicators of the organisational conditions of interest intermediation systems that enhance the exercise of political power. The indicators are illustrated through a comparative study of the banking sector at the European Community level and in five countries: Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The comparison of the banking sector interest intermediation systems shows that the power of banks in Germany rests not only on their equity participation in large industrial concerns, but also on a highly developed interest intermediation system, the most integrated of the five countries. The analysis demonstrates from still another perspective the close imbrication of the state and finance in France. Finally; the article demonstrates the deep fragmentation of the US associational system, a system that has acted as a serious obstacle to banking system reform in America.     

Elites and Regimes in Comparative Perspective: Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia

Because of the diversity that characterizes politics in Southeast Asia, area specialists hasve lacked a framework for comparative analysis. Drawing on some of the recent transitions literature, this article argues the worth of investigating political regime forms, the extent to which a country's politics are stable or unstable and democratic or authoritarian. It then focuses on three important Southeast Asian countries — Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand — analyzing stabilitylinstability in terms of state elites and their rules of the game, while considering democracylauthoriturianism in terms of societal audiences and legitimating "mentalities." Briefly, Indonesia's authoritarian regime (and its strong appearance of stability) is attributed to astute personalist leadership, muted elite rivalries, and control over societal audiences. In contrast, Thailand's unstable democracy emerges from uneven national leadership, perennial elite disunity, and episodic surges in societal pressures. And Malaysia's semi-democratic regime — in some ways bordered by the outcomes in Indonesia and Thailand — is explained by skilful national leadership and sustained elite unity, offsetting the country's ftuctuating levels of societal tensions and claims.     

RESPONSES OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TO LEGISLATION PROVIDING MORE SEVERE THREATENED SANCTIONS

In 1971, the Tennessee legislature enacted legislation providing for mandatory jail sentences and driver's license revocations for anyone convicted of driving while intoxicated. This new law had no demonstrable impact on the highway traffic fatalities rate-the intended objective. This paper explores the reasons for this apparent lack of impact. Data suggest that, while there was some increase in the severity of sanctions imposed on drunken drivers, there was still a consistent tendency to suspend the jail sentences and grant drivers restricted driving privileges. Nor is there any reason to believe that the police intensified their efforts to apprehend larger numbers of drunken drivers. Thus, the more severe sanctions threatened in the new law were generally mitigated in practice. Some possible interpretations for this are offered.