DOES CRIME JUST MOVE AROUND THE CORNER? A CONTROLLED STUDY OF SPATIAL DISPLACEMENT AND DIFFUSION OF CRIME CONTROL BENEFITS*

Recent studies point to the potential theoretical and practical benefits of focusing police resources on crime hot spots. However, many scholars have noted that such approaches risk displacing crime or disorder to other places where programs are not in place. Although much attention has been paid to the idea of displacement, methodological problems associated with measuring it have often been overlooked. We try to fill these gaps in measurement and understanding of displacement and the related phenomenon of diffusion of crime control benefits. Our main focus is on immediate spatial displacement or diffusion of crime to areas near the targeted sites of an intervention. Do focused crime prevention efforts at places simply result in a movement of offenders to areas nearby targeted sites—“do they simply move crime around the corner”? Or, conversely, will a crime prevention effort focusing on specific places lead to improvement in areas nearby—what has come to be termed a diffusion of crime control benefits? Our data are drawn from a controlled study of displacement and diffusion in Jersey City, New Jersey. Two sites with substantial street‐level crime and disorder were targeted and carefully monitored during an experimental period. Two neighboring areas were selected as “catchment areas” from which to assess immediate spatial displacement or diffusion. Intensive police interventions were applied to each target site but not to the catchment areas. More than 6,000 20‐minute social observations were conducted in the target and catchment areas. They were supplemented by interviews and ethnographic field observations. Our findings indicate that, at least for crime markets involving drugs and prostitution, crime does not simply move around the corner. Indeed, this study supports the position that the most likely outcome of such focused crime prevention efforts is a diffusion of crime control benefits to nearby areas.     

¡Que se Vayan Todos! Popular Insurrection and the Asambleas Barriales in Argentina

In December 2001, Argentina experienced a decisive crisis. A financial collapse accelerated by the massive flight of capital and the IMF denial of a new loan was followed by a popular insurrection which, by putting forward the slogan ¡ que se vayan todos, que no quede ni uno solo ! forced the resignation of national authorities. Whilst Duhalde's provisional government is negotiating the conditions for international financial support, faced with inflation and the rise of the dollar exchange rate, social mobilisation is expanding in new forms. This paper argues that the popular insurrection of December 2001 opened a space for the reinvention of the political as negative politics, the asambleas barriales constituting one example of this.     

Influence of electricity on post-mortal body temperature

In a case of suicidal application of electricity differences between the rectal temperature of the body and the suspected time of death were observed.In order to answer the question whether an electric current from hand to hand over >30 min led to a rise in body temperature FEM-based computer simulations and animal experiments were carried out. Both resulted in a warming of the soft parts in the arm without warming the body core. Thus a temperature-based estimation of the time since death can also be used in cases with electricity as the cause of death. Besides, in the animal experiment we found a spontaneous rise in the body core temperature even without application of electricity which may be a reason for the typical temperature plateau after death.     

The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Protection: The Case of Software

The end of the twentieth century was marked by a sea change in global governance in the realm of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Whereas countries historically retained substantial autonomy with regard to what they defined as intellectual "property" and the rights granted to the owners of intellectual property, the 1990s witnessed the establishment of new global obligations regarding national practices. This paper focuses on the case of software "piracy" to assess the mechanisms by which the new global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are transmitted from the international to the national levels. We first consider a set of national-level factors that many scholars have shown to be important determinants of IPR policy. We then supplement the standard emphasis on domestic factors with an analysis of new transnational factors: countries' multilateral obligations under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and bilateral pressures from the United States to increase the protection of IPRs. Population-averaged panel data models are used to assess the effects of these national and transnational determinants on levels of software piracy in 80 countries from 1994 to 2002. Our results indicate that membership in the WTO and bilateral pressures from the United States—particularly pressures that offer reciprocal concessions—lead to substantial increases in levels of protection in rich and poor countries. There is, in short, a new international political economy of intellectual property.