Executive Particularism and Ministerial Selection in India

Why do political parties in parliamentary systems undertake actions, such as joining a coalition government, that will entail significant costs for their members in subsequent elections? Recent research points to the incentive structures faced by differentially positioned members of a parliamentary party: unlike backbenchers, MPs who hold a ministerial portfolio can use the prerequisites of executive office to shield themselves from the costs of governance. This article tests the theory of executive particularism by examining the electoral fortunes of government ministers in India. Sitting government ministers are found to outperform other candidates; however, tests of causality fail to demonstrate that holding a ministerial portfolio causes this electoral benefit. Instead, it appears that a candidate’s electoral performance enhances the likelihood of being granted a ministerial portfolio in the first place. This finding raises questions about the generalizability of claims that party elites can use ministerial office to shield themselves from the costs of governing.     

Uncovering land tenure insecurities: tips for tenure responsive land-use planning in Ethiopia

Land-use planning, although a mechanism for development, can also generate insecurity during its implementation. This article argues that tenure security and land-use planning should not be implemented in isolation from each other. It posits that land-use planning – rather than restricting the security of people's tenure – has the potential to serve as a means of securing tenure. The article explores tenure (in)security elements in land-use planning as a crucial challenge in the urban town of Gelan Sidama Awash, Ethiopia. Using data collected through stakeholders’ interviews, it uncovers their tenure security challenges, and outlines a set of measures for enhancing tenure security through land-use planning.     

Consolidating ZIP Codes for Small Area Fair Market Rents: A Method for Implementing the New Rule

Fair Market Rents (FMRs), calculated for an entire metropolitan region, are used to establish payment standards for the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program. In response to recent criticism that FMRs do not represent rent disparity and restrict households from moving to high-opportunity areas, a new rule introducing Small Area Fair Market Rents (SAFMRs) has been issued. SAFMRs are based on ZIP codes to reflect local market rents and increase the number of payment standards used to administer the HCV program. The purpose of this research is to determine whether the number of payment standards can be reduced by consolidating ZIP codes, while adhering to the primary objectives of the SAFMR rule. The ZIP code grouping process conducted offers one method for reducing the number of payment standards needed to implement the new rule; however, the rent analysis reveals the over- and underestimation of SAFMRs for some ZIP codes.     

Energy Transition by Conviction or by Surprise? Environmental Policy from 2009 to 2013

With the inauguration of the new federal government in 2009, many Germans were afraid of a rollback in energy and climate policy. Indeed, Christian democrats and liberals extended the operational lifespan of nuclear power plants but also continued with the previous green energy policy, known as Energiewende (energy transition). Beginning with a strong ideological separation, the Fukushima accident in Japan provoked a u-turn in nuclear policy, leading the government to abandon the lifespan extensions and to intensify the implementation of Energiewende, which became one of the core policy projects of the Merkel II cabinet then. Moreover, a new kind of consensus atmosphere was established which helped to settle some controversial environmental problems. Albeit policy outcomes concerning Energiewende were rather mixed, energy and climate policy was a rather low ranking issues during the federal election campaign in 2013.     

Sustainable governance of natural resources and institutional change–an analytical framework

This article presents a conceptual framework for analysing the governance of natural resource use, as governance is often the primary issue when natural resources are overexploited and degraded. It addresses both spontaneous and active governance, including institutional change induced by development co‐operation. Drawing on existing frameworks of institutional analysis, fundamental modifications are presented to adapt the concept to the context of international co‐operation, and to include dynamic aspects of institutional change as well as multiple actor interactions. Tested in several case studies, the framework was found suitable and relevant for use in project planning and evaluation, as well as for comparing governance issues across cases in a conceptually rigorous way. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.