Markt oder Schließung? Zu den Ursachen der Steigerung der Einkommensungleichheit

This article examines which factors contribute towards the increase in the income inequality that can be observed in Germany since the 1990’s. While economists believe that the qualification of employees is becoming more and more important for the generation of income inequality, sociologists conceive social closure, implemented in institutional structures, class conflicts and mechanisms of discrimination, as responsible for rising inequality. Analyses of “Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung”-data show that closure mechanisms are especially important in West Germany, while qualification-related factors enhance inequality in East Germany.     

Die Europäische Bürgerinitiative. Grundlagen, Bedingungen und Verfahren

Mit Inkrafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon am 1. Dezember 2009 wurde auf Ebene der Europäischen Union erstmals ein Element direkter Demokratie primärrechtlich verankert: die Europäische Bürgerinitiative. Diese stellt ein neues Recht der UnionsbürgerInnen dar, muss aber erst noch sekundärrechtlich näher ausgestaltet werden. Seit Ende März 2010 liegt ein entsprechender Vorschlag der Kommission für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vor. Die darin vorgesehenen Verfahren und Bedingungen sollen klar, einfach und benutzerfreundlich sein sowie gewährleisten, dass Bürgerinitiativen einerseits repräsentativ für ein unionsweites Interesse und andererseits als Instrument einfach zu handhaben sind. Sie sollen ferner sicherstellen, dass für alle UnionsbürgerInnen unabhängig von dem Mitgliedstaat, aus dem sie stammen, die gleichen Bedingungen für die Teilnahme an einer Bürgerinitiative gelten. Der gegenständliche Beitrag stellt die Grundlagen sowie die Bedingungen und Verfahren der Europäischen Bürgerinitiative dar und geht (noch) offenen Rechtsfragen nach.     

Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others

This article attempts to show that future players and future stakes—two factors generally ignored by political scientists—strongly influence government decisions to cooperate or fight at least against ethnic minorities seeking self-determination. Data on all separatist movements between 1956 and 2002 reveals that governments are significantly less likely to accommodate one challenge if the number of ethnic groups in a country and the combined value of the land that may come under dispute in the future is high. Governments that refused to accommodate one challenger were also significantly less likely to face a second or third challenge down the road. This provides some of the first systematic evidence that governments invest in reputation building a least in the domain of domestic ethnic relations.     

Robust Estimation and Outlier Detection for Overdispersed Multinomial Models of Count Data

We develop a robust estimator—the hyperbolic tangent (tanh) estimator—for overdispersed multinomial regression models of count data. The tanh estimator provides accurate estimates and reliable inferences even when the specified model is not good for as much as half of the data. Seriously ill-fitted counts—outliers—are identified as part of the estimation. A Monte Carlo sampling experiment shows that the tanh estimator produces good results at practical sample sizes even when ten percent of the data are generated by a significantly different process. The experiment shows that, with contaminated data, estimation fails using four other estimators: the nonrobust maximum likelihood estimator, the additive logistic model and two SUR models. Using the tanh estimator to analyze data from Florida for the 2000 presidential election matches well-known features of the election that the other four estimators fail to capture. In an analysis of data from the 1993 Polish parliamentary election, the tanh estimator gives sharper inferences than does a previously proposed heteroskedastic SUR model .