Halfway down the road to supervision of the Spanish intelligence services

For most of its history the United Nations was reluctant to deal with intelligence and major powers were reluctant to share intelligence with it. But as the UN's peacekeeping operations intensified in some of the world's hot spots in the early 1990s, the UN found it both necessary and wise to create an information analysis capability at UN headquarters in New York. To funnel selected intelligence to the headquarters, several countries (including the US, UK, France and Russia) loaned intelligence officers to the UN's Situation Centre on a secondment basis. This paper describes the activities of the SitCen's Information and Research (I&R) Unit that existed from 1993 to 1999 under the informal motto ‘Keeping an Eye on the World’. Using a case study of I&R reporting on the situation in Eastern Zaire (1996), where UN-run refugee camps were under attack, it is possible to examine the nature and utility of the intelligence provided by the intelligence officers to UN decision-makers and the planners of the Canadian-led multinational force in the region. It reveals that the Unit provided significant and useful intelligence about arms shipments, belligerent activities, and the status of refugees and made several prescient predictions and warnings. The Unit sought to minimize national bias and incomplete information, though both problems were still in evidence. Still, in many ways, the I&R Unit remains a useful model for the development of a future intelligence capability.     

Electronic Eyes on the Green Line: Surveillance by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

The 1974 Cypriot War divided the island of Cyprus into two parts with a narrow demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the opposing Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces. The volatility and violence in this zone, called the ‘Green Line’, necessitated a constant UN peacekeeping presence that was achieved mainly with manned observation posts (OPs). About 150 of these posts were established by 1975 to maintain stability and prevent flare-ups, including any lethal exchanges between the two sides. By the early 1990s, many of the countries contributing peacekeepers to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) had become tired of the stalemate and the lack of progress in negotiations (peacemaking), so they withdrew their troops from the force. This necessitated a reduction in the number of constantly manned OPs from 51 in 1992 to 21 in mid-1993. Further downsizing of UNFICYP by the UN Security Council in 2004 gave rise to a new approach to monitor the DMZ and produce actionable intelligence. Cameras were installed in hot-spots in the Nicosia DMZ and more responsive patrols were introduced as part of the new ‘concentration with mobility’ concept. This was the first time a UN peace operation used unattended cameras to monitor a demilitarized zone. This article examines the UN's difficulties and successes using the remote cameras, especially during important incidents. Other technologies that aided UNFICYP are also reviewed for lessons that might assist an under-equipped United Nations in its watchkeeping function.     

Homicide by unusual‐edged weapons: Forensic considerations of two cases

Homicide by stab wound is common worldwide. However, the use of unusual edged weapons is rarely reported in the forensic literature. Here, we report two cases of homicide involving a Japanese sword, or katana, and a sickle. Both of these weapons can create either stab or incised wounds with some particularities. In our cases, characteristics of the external wounds, internal injuries, and the depth of penetration raised the possibility of an unusual weapon. Meticulous forensic examination of these injuries (morphological characteristics, depth of penetration, trajectories, and cut marks in the bone) may allow the forensic expert to determine the type of weapon used.     

Identification of furosemide in hair in a post‐mortem case by UHPLC‐MS/MS with guidance on interpretation

Testing for drugs in hair raises several difficulties. Among them is the interpretation of the final concentration(s). In a post‐mortem case, analyses revealed the presence of furosemide (12 ng/mL) in femoral blood, although it was not part of the victim's treatment. The prosecutor requested our laboratory to undertake an additional analysis in hair to obtain information about the use of furosemide. A specific method was therefore developed and validated to identify and quantify furosemide in hair by UHPLC‐MS/MS. After decontamination of 30 mg of hair, incubation in acidic condition, extraction with ethyl acetate, the samples were analyzed by UHPLC‐MS/MS. Furosemide was found in the victim's hair at 225 pg/mg. However, it was not possible to interpret this concentration due to the absence of data in the literature. Therefore, the authors performed a controlled study in two parts. In order to establish the basis of interpretation, several volunteers were tested (four after a single 20 mg administration and twenty‐four under daily treatment). The first part indicated that a single dose is not detectable in hair using our method. The second part demonstrated concentrations ranging from 5 to 1110 pg/mg with no correlation between dosage and hair concentrations. The decedent's hair result was interpreted as repeated exposures. In the case of furosemide analysis, hair can provide information about its presence but cannot give information about dosage or frequency of use.