The competitive incentives of vertically integrated local exchange carriers: An economic and policy analysis

The U.S. Congress passed sweeping telecommunications reform legislation in 1996 that will enable the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) to enter the interLATA long-distance market once certain conditions are met. This legislation empowers the state public service commissions, the Federal Communications Commission and the Justice Department to determine collectively when RBOC entry into interLATA long-distance markets satisfies the public interest. This article reveals that as long as RBOC long-distance market shares remain below certain critical levels, the RBOCs do not have the incentives (despite having the opportunity) to discriminate against their downstream competitors. These findings suggest that a public policy focused exclusively on eliminating the opportunity to discriminate may needlessly delay RBOC entry into interLATA markets and thereby deprive consumers of the benefits of enhanced competition.     

Balancing Accountability and Efficiency in a More Competitive Public Sector Environment

Extract from a speech delivered at Government-in-Excellence Summit 2000, 'Reinventing Government — A Manifesto for Achieving Excellence and Managing for Results in the New Millennium', 24–26 May, Singapore, (For the full text see www.anao.gov.au)