PUBLIC SERVANTS AND THE BRIEFING OF PARTY COMMITTEES

Abstract: Politicians need information. In recent years the practice of public servants briefing party committees has been expanded to help fill that need. In part this was due to the increased influence of caucus committees under the Labor government, but the practice has continued. Public servants provide information and explanations of policy to government and opposition members, although in the latter case public servants have to tread carefully. In December 1976 the Prime Minister tabled guidelines to govern these briefings. This innovation has implications for the doctrines of public service neutrality, for ministerial responsibility and for the capacity of the opposition to develop workable policy. Despite the potential problems that may arise, it is a practice that, if used effectively, can only assist in the improvement of political debate.     

Disentangling Concepts of Ministerial Responsibility

Debates on ministerial responsibility have too often gone around in circles. The application of the principle is related to the incidence of resignations; analysis considers the reasons given for resignation or, rather more often, the reasons given for not resigning. The usual conclusions are that ministers resign occasionally when their personal involvement is unquestioned and when the prime minister determines that the political costs are less to let the minister go. But the ideas remain at a broad level because they relate to all the ministerial activities. This article seeks to disentangle these concepts, developing the ideas in Thompson and Tillotsen's article in this symposium, to see if a different set of concepts can better define this old notion.     

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service under stress

Abstract: In 1984 the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) replaced the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This article assesses whether or not the new service is likely to be more effective than its predecessor and yet engender fewer fears that it might itself undermine what it seeks to defend. After briefly discussing the problems and events that led to the creation of the new service the article analyses the structural and legal changes that have taken place. The new instruments by which the CSIS is held accountable, such as the ofice of the Inspector General and the Security Intelligence Review Committee, are then examined followed by an analysis of the changes in the political ethos both within and without the CSIS. The article concludes by arguing that the new agency is likely to be both a more effective intelligence agency and a more responsible and responsive one. Sommaire: En 1984, le Service canadien de renseignements d'intelligence (SCRI) a remplacé le Service de sécurité de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada. Dans cet article, on examine la probabilité que le nouveau service soit plus eficace que son précurseur tout en réduisant les inquiétudes de ceux qui craignent qu'il ne détruise précisément ce qu'il est censé défendre. Après un bref exposé des problèmes et des événements qui ont amené l'établissement du nouveau senice, l'article analyse l'évolution structurelle et juridique qui a eu lieu. De nouveaux instruments qui assurent l'imputabilité du SCRI, comme le bureau de l'Inspecteur général et le Comité de surveillance des activités de renseignements de sécurité font alors l'objet d'examen; suit une analyse de l'évolution de la pensée politique à l'interieur comme à l'extérieur du SCRI. En conclusion, on y affirme que le nouvel organisme sera probablement une agence de renseignements plus efficace ainsi que plus responsable et plus susceptible de contrôle.     

The Human Dimensions of Pollution Policy Implementation: Air quality in rural China

The People's Republic of China is experiencing severe air pollution with very serious public health and economic consequences. Over the past decade, the Chinese government has sought to utilize bureaucratic, political, legal and educational vehicles to address these problems. This paper examines the ways in which those policy measures have been communicated to, understood by, and acted upon by the citizenry, drawing in important part on household and epidemiological surveys conducted in Anhui. Our study suggests that the central government's message has yet to be absorbed to the degree intended and then considers both why this has been the case and how the effectiveness of policy mechanisms might be enhanced.     

Inner cabinets and outer ministers: some lessons from Australia and Britain

Abstract. The growth in the number of ministers has led to problems in the organization of cabinet. In Britain, and in Australia under Liberal-Country Party government, a system of inner cabinets and outer ministers has been adopted. In Australia all ministers have their own departments - as dictated by the Constitution;those who are not full members of cabinet are able to attend cabinet and participate, not only when items of their own or related portfolios are discussed, but also on a range of other issues in which they have a personal interest. In Britain all departments are headed by a cabinet minister. Each cabinet member is assisted by a range of junior ministers whose access to cabinet is limited and whose broad knowledge of government activity is therefore severely limited. In making cabinet there is thus a choice between a small cabinet, representing only parts of government interests but with flexible access, and a large representative cabinet with limited access for junior ministers. Sommaire. .?augmentation du nombre des ministres présente des difficultés pour ?organisation du cabinet. La Grande-Bretagne et ?Australie, sous un gouvernement libéral-rural, ont adopté un système de cabinets restreints et de ministres ← externes →. En Australie, tous les ministres ont, de la par la Constitution, leur propre ministère; ceux qui ne sont pas membres à part entiére du cabinet peuvent assister à ses déliberations et y participer, et cela aussi bien lorsque les débats portent sur des questions relevant de leur portefeuille que lorsqu'elles présentent pour eux un intérêt particulier. En Grande-Bretagne, tous les ministères sont dirigés par un ministre du cabinet. Chaque ministre du cabinet est aidé par un groupe de ministres de deuxième rang dont ?accès au cabinet est limité et dont, par conséquent, la connaissance générate des activités gouvernementales est aussi sévèrement réduite. Pour composer le cabinet, il y a done un choix entre un cabinet restreint ne représentant que partiellement les intérêts du gouvernement mais dont ?accès est ajustable et un large cabinet représentatif avec accés limité pour les ministres de deuxième rang.